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Beginning with Pennsylvania in 1794, most American jurisdictions have, at one 
time or another, separated the crime of murder into two degrees based on the 
presence or absence of premeditation and deliberation. An intentional, 
premeditated, and deliberate murder is murder of the first degree, while second-
degree murder is committed intentionally but without premeditation or 
deliberation. The distinction was created in order to limit the use of the death 
penalty, which generally has been imposed only for first-degree murder. 
Critics have attacked the premeditation-deliberation formula on two fronts. 
First, they have charged that the formula is imprecise as a measure of the relative 
culpability or dangerousness of intentional murderers. The premeditation-
deliberation formula, the critics tell us, is incapable of segregating out the worst 
murderers because it is both under- and overinclusive. In addition, critics have 
pointed to the courts’ inability or unwillingness to apply the premeditation-
deliberation formula in any coherent fashion. Many courts have held that the 
premeditation and deliberation required to transform a mere intentional, second-
degree murder into first-degree murder can be formed in the instant before the 
killing. Thus do many courts fail to meaningfully distinguish one degree of 
intentional murder from the other. This second failing appears inextricably related 
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to the first: since many unplanned but intentional murders are as bad as or worse 
than many planned killings, and their perpetrators at least as dangerous, courts 
contort the meanings of premeditation and deliberation to allow the most culpable 
and dangerous murderers to be punished most harshly. 
These criticisms are founded on the premise that the distinction between first- 
and second-degree murder is grounded solely upon principles of retribution and 
incapacitation. What the critics have overlooked is that there is a powerful 
deterrence-based rationale for distinguishing premeditated, deliberate murders 
from those that are unpremeditated or nondeliberate. Where a murder is 
premeditated and deliberate, it is much more likely that the murderer has not only 
planned out the crime itself but has developed a plausible way to avoid or delay 
detection. Because the value of punishment as a deterrent depends in large part on 
the likelihood and swiftness of punishment, crimes that are less likely to be 
punished swiftly, all other things being equal, ought to be punished more severely. 
Thus, given two equally dangerous and culpable intentional murderers, we are 
arguably justified in punishing more severely the one who, by virtue of better 
planning beforehand, is more likely to escape or delay detection. 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 1794, most American jurisdictions have recognized at least two 
forms of intentional murder, the distinguishing feature of which is the presence or 
absence of premeditation and deliberation on the part of the murderer. Thus, many 
states punish more severely those murderers who act with premeditation and 
deliberation than those who act intentionally but in an unpremeditated or 
nondeliberate manner. Murders in the former class are deemed murder in the first 
degree, and those in the latter class are considered murder in the second degree. 
Typically, the distinction has been explained on both retributivist and 
incapacitationist grounds. From a retributivist standpoint, those who act with 
premeditation and deliberation have greater moral culpability than other intentional 
murderers and therefore deserve greater punishment. From an incapacitationist 
standpoint, those who act with premeditation and deliberation are more dangerous 
than other intentional murderers, and thus require greater incapacitation than the 
typical murderer. 
Critics have attacked the premeditation-deliberation formula on both theoretical 
and practical levels. In terms of theory, they point out, it has never quite been clear 
whether the typical premeditated and deliberate murderer really is more dangerous 
or more culpable than the typical unpremeditated or nondeliberate murderer. One 
can point to many cases of unpremeditated or nondeliberate murder, both real and 
imagined, that seem worse than many instances of premeditated and deliberate 
murder. The premeditation and deliberation formula, the critics tell us, is incapable 
of segregating out the worst murderers. 
Critics also point to the courts’ inability or unwillingness to apply the 
premeditation and deliberation formula in any coherent fashion. Many courts have 
held that the premeditation and deliberation required to transform a mere 
intentional, second-degree murder into a first-degree murder can be formed in the 
instant before the actual killing. Thus do many courts fail to meaningfully 
distinguish one degree of intentional murder from the other. This second failing 
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appears inextricably related to the first: since many unplanned but intentional 
murders are as bad as or worse than many planned killings, and their perpetrators at 
least as dangerous, courts contort the meanings of premeditation and deliberation to 
allow the most culpable and dangerous murderers to be punished as severely as the 
law allows. 
What the critics fail to fully appreciate, however, is that the premeditation-
deliberation formula can additionally be justified on the principle of deterrence. 
This Article supplies what is missing from existing critiques of homicide law: a 
deterrence-based rationale for distinguishing premeditated and deliberate murders 
from those that are unpremeditated or nondeliberate. Whether or not intentional 
murderers who also premeditate and deliberate are the most dangerous and culpable 
killers, they are the most deterrable. More importantly, because the value of 
punishment as a deterrent depends in large measure on the likelihood of swift 
punishment, crimes that are harder to detect and prosecute, all other things being 
equal, ought to be punished more severely. Where a murder is premeditated and 
deliberate, it is much more likely that the murderer has not only thought out the 
crime itself but has developed a plausible means of avoiding, or at least delaying, 
detection. The premeditation-deliberation formula thus seeks to identify those 
killers most likely to escape or significantly delay detection, apprehension, and 
punishment, requiring that punishment severity be maximized to offset the 
diminished certainty and swiftness of punishment for such culprits. Given two 
equally dangerous and culpable intentional murderers, the theory goes, we are 
justified in punishing more severely the one who, by virtue of better planning 
beforehand, is more likely to escape or delay detection. 
I. THE PREMEDITATION-DELIBERATION FORMULA:  
THE DOCTRINE AND ITS DIFFICULTIES 
The concept of premeditation and deliberation is one of the most controversial 
in the field of homicide law.1 The premeditation-deliberation formula has been with 
us since Pennsylvania introduced the concept in 1794.2 Today, it is the device used 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, On Premeditation, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 627, 627 
(1998) (“I doubt any other element connected to the crime of murder is as controversial as 
premeditation.”). 
 2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 123 (1980) (“The first major limitation on 
capital murder in the United States was the Pennsylvania Act of 1794.”); GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2.3, at 253 (1978) (noting that the premeditation-
deliberation formula was introduced in 1794 by Pennsylvania); SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, 
JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 101 (1998) (noting 
that Pennsylvania introduced the concept of premeditation and deliberation in 1794); Frank 
Brenner, The Impulsive Murder and the Degree Device, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 274, 274 
(1953); Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 375 (1994) (“[T]he 
Pennsylvania legislature first divided the crime of murder into degrees in 1794.”); Charles L. 
Hobson, Reforming California’s Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 526 (1996) 
(“American jurisdictions have been dividing murder into degrees since the landmark 
Pennsylvania reforms of 1794.”); Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What Is 
Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 75 (2001) (“The common law crime of murder 
was divided into two degrees by statutory reform in Pennsylvania in 1794.”); Suzanne 
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to separate first- from second-degree murder in about half the states. However, it 
has come under withering attack from virtually all who have studied the law of 
homicide. The attack has come on two fronts. First, commentators have noted the 
imprecision in the terms “premeditation” and “deliberation.” Second, they have 
asserted that the formula fails to segregate out the very worst murders for special 
treatment. 
A. The Doctrine 
Prior to 1794, there were no separate degrees of murder in any common-law 
jurisdiction.3 In that year, Pennsylvania revolutionized the law of homicide by 
adopting a statute that divided murders into two degrees (the “1794 Statute”): 
[A]ll murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying 
in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated 
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shall be deemed 
murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be 
deemed murder in the second degree . . . .4 
The Pennsylvania reform swept across the Nation.5 It was adopted by Virginia two 
                                                                                                                 
Mounts, Premeditation and Deliberation in California: Returning to a Distinction Without a 
Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 261–62 (2002) (“In 1794 . . . Pennsylvania became the 
first state to enact a statue that divided murder into degrees.”); Leo M. Romero, A Critique of 
the Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Formula for Distinguishing Between First and 
Second Degree Murder in New Mexico, 18 N.M. L. REV. 73, 82 (1988) (“The willful, 
deliberate and premeditated language . . . first appeared in a 1794 Pennsylvania 
statute . . . .”); Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1007, 1012 (2001) (discussing the 1794 Pennsylvania statute). 
  It appears that the term “willful and premeditated murder” dates back to at least the 
so-called Hempstead Code of 1664. See Harry E. Barnes, The Criminal Codes and Penal 
Institutions of Colonial Pennsylvania, 11 BULL. FRIENDS’ HIST. SOC’Y PHILA. 3, 4 (1922). In 
1682, while still a colony under the leadership of William Penn, Pennsylvania had restricted 
use of the death penalty to those who committed premeditated or willful killings. See id. at 9; 
WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY HOW FAR THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NECESSARY IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (1793), reprinted in 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 122, 133–35 (1968); Edwin R. 
Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 
759, 760–61 (1949); Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
145, 145–46 (1999). In 1718, however, these laws were repealed and Pennsylvania’s laws 
were once again brought into conformance with those of mother England. See MARCELLO 
MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM 17, 138 (1973); Barnes, 
supra, at 13–15; BRADFORD, supra, at 136–37; Keedy, supra, at 762–63. 
 3. See Mounts, supra note 2, at 273 (“[T]he common law recognized no divisions 
within the law of murder; that step was accomplished by statute.”). 
 4. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1777, § 2, 15 Pa. Stat. 174, 175. 
 5. Mounts, supra note 2, at 262 n.5 (“Most other states also followed Pennsylvania’s 
lead and enacted statutes that made premeditated and deliberate murder first degree.”); 
Pauley, supra note 2, at 146 (“Soon, many states copied the Pennsylvania 
premeditation/deliberation distinction.”); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 
24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 453 (1990) (observing that Pennsylvania’s division of murder 
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years later,6 and “by the early twentieth century most American jurisdictions 
recognized some form of premeditation doctrine.”7 The premeditation-deliberation 
formula was in its ascendancy by mid-century, when over three-quarters of the 
states used it as the dividing line between first- and second-degree murder.8 
Within a few years, that number dropped somewhat,9 and in the ensuing decades 
the premeditation-deliberation formula suffered a moderate decline,10 probably as a 
result of the influence of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code 
(MPC) which does not divide murder into degrees.11 Yet, the prediction made more 
than a half-century ago that “the degree device . . . will be reduced to an historical 
oddity”12 has not come to pass. Currently, twenty-six states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government utilize some form of the premeditation-
deliberation formula, at least in part, to distinguish first- from second-degree 
murder.13 Of these, seventeen states subject to capital punishment only those guilty 
                                                                                                                 
into degrees “proved popular in the new republic”). 
 6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 123 (1980). 
 7. PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 101; see also David Crump, “Murder, Pennsylvania 
Style”: Comparing Traditional American Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal 
Code Jurisdictions, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 257, 259 (2007) (“[O]ther states from Maine to 
California have imitated [Pennsylvania].”); Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 76 (“The vast majority 
of American jurisdictions ultimately followed the Pennsylvania reform . . . .”); Romero, 
supra note 2, at 82 (“[T]he scheme became a common feature in murder statutes in the 
United States.”). 
 8. E.g., Brenner, supra note 2, at 274 (noting that thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia had adopted the formula by 1953); A. Singleton Cagle, Note, The Intentional 
Murder at Common Law and Under Modern Statutes, 38 KY. L.J. 424, 431 (1950) (noting 
that the Pennsylvania distinction had been adopted in thirty-eight states as of 1950). 
 9. See Givelber, supra note 2, at 380 (“As of 1959, thirty-four states employed a 
murder statute modeled on or closely resembling the Pennsylvania formula.”).  
 10. See Crump, supra note 7, at 300 (“American jurisdictions have increasingly rejected 
the premeditation-deliberation formula.”). 
 11. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a), at 13 (1980). 
 12. Brenner, supra note 2, at 294. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006) (“willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated”); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A)(1) (2010) (“premeditation”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
101(a)(4) (2006) (“premeditated and deliberated purpose”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 
2010) (“willful, deliberate, and premeditated”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102(1)(a) 
(West 2002) (“deliberation”); D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2001) (“deliberate and premeditated”); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(1) (West 2007) (“premeditated”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
4003(a) (2004) (“willful, deliberate and premeditated”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.2(1) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2010) (“willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation”); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-3401(a) (2007) (“with premeditation”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(a)(1) 
(2002) (“deliberate, premeditated, and willful”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (LexisNexis 
2002) (“deliberately premeditated”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1)(a) (West 2004) 
(“willful, deliberate, and premeditated”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a)(1) (West 2009) 
(“with premeditation”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.020(1) (West 1999) (“deliberation”); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-303 (LexisNexis 2009) (“deliberate and premeditated”); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 200.030(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-
a(I)(a), (II) (2007) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(1) (West 2003) (“willful, 
deliberate and premeditated”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West 2000) (“willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A) (LexisNexis 2010) 
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of first-degree murder.14 Thus, in these states, a finding that the defendant killed not 
just intentionally but also with premeditation and deliberation can mean the 
difference between life and death. Moreover, the maximum penalty for second-
degree murder tends to be a prison term short of life imprisonment. In Arizona, for 
example, while first-degree murder is punishable by a maximum sentence of 
death,15 second-degree murder is punishable by a maximum sentence of sixteen 
years in prison.16 
To be guilty of first-degree murder of the premeditation-deliberation variety, the 
defendant must intend to kill.17 However, intention to kill is merely necessary, not 
sufficient, to render a murder one of the first degree.18 The actor must also 
“premeditate the killing and deliberate about it.”19 These terms imply “an element 
of coolness, of calm reflection.”20 They also “suggest a plan or design conceived 
                                                                                                                 
(“prior calculation and design”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2002) (“willful, deliberate, 
malicious, and premeditated”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(1), (d) (2006 & Supp. 
2009) (“premeditated”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2009) (“wilful [sic], deliberate and 
premeditated”); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-32 (2009 & Supp. 2010) (“willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.020, 9A.32.030(1)(a) 
(West 2010) (“premeditated”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (LexisNexis 2005) (“willful, 
deliberate and premeditated”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101(a) (2009) (“premeditated”). 
 14. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-751(A), 13-752(A) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
101(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-1.3-1201(1)(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-4004 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439(a) (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 
2-201(b)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 29-2519(1) (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030(4), (5) (LexisNexis 
2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(c) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
31 (Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.020, 10.95.030 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-2-101(b) (2009). 
 15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(A) (2010). 
 16. Id. § 13-710(A). 
 17. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 14.7(a), at 766 (4th ed. 2003). 
 18. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.03(C)(1), at 514 (5th 
ed. 2009) (“Most jurisdictions understand ‘wilful, deliberate, premeditated’ to mean more 
than an intention to kill.”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 154 (“A murderer may kill intentionally 
but without premeditating.”); Julie Engels, Note, Mens Rea: Purpose to Kill Offenses, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (2003) (“[A] purpose to kill alone is not sufficient to support a 
finding of premeditation.”). 
 19. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 766; see also Crump, supra note 7, at 263 (“[F]irst-
degree murder generally requires a ‘deliberate’ and ‘premeditated’ killing.”); Rollin M. 
Perkins, The Law of Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 391, 449 (1946) (“[A] fatal 
act might be intentional and yet entirely too hasty to be deliberate and premeditated.”); 
Engels, supra note 18, at 1402 (“While premeditated murder requires a purpose to kill, it 
also demands a ‘preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations.’” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting People v. Perez, 831 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Cal. 1992))). 
 20. Pauley, supra note 2, at 153; see also Brenner, supra note 2, at 280 (observing that 
the terms imply “the operation of a rational mental process which questions the execution of 
a plan to kill and subsequently decides to complete the plan to the exclusion of other 
alternatives”); Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 655 (“[I]t would be suitable to require that the 
process of deliberation be carried out composedly and in a calm state of mind, and not in a 
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well in advance of the homicidal act,”21 indicating that there must be “a significant 
lapse of time between initial determination to kill and the act of killing.”22 
Wayne LaFave helpfully suggests the following distinctions between the 
necessary elements of intent, premeditation, and deliberation: “[F]or premeditation 
the killer asks himself the question, ‘Shall I kill him?’. The intent to kill aspect of 
the crime is found in the answer, ‘Yes, I shall.’ The deliberation part of the crime 
requires a thought like, ‘Wait, what about the consequences? Well, I’ll do it 
anyway.’”23 Thus, premeditation is thought to require some quantity of time for 
reflection on the homicidal act before the killing is performed,24 while deliberation 
                                                                                                                 
tempestuous state of mind.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 261 (“In the public mind a ‘deliberate 
and premeditated murder’ involves careful and precise planning by a cold, detached, ruthless 
killer . . . .”); Perkins, supra note 19, at 448 (“Deliberation means that the act is done in a 
cool state of blood.” (quoting State v. Benson, 111 S.E. 869, 871 (N.C. 1922))); Herbert 
Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 
701, 707 (1937) (observing that deliberation suggests the decision to kill was reached 
“calmly”). 
 21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980); see also M. Patricia Walther, 
Note, Should Virginia Put the Planning Back into the Premeditation Required for Murder?, 
40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 345 (1983) (“For first degree murder, a killer deliberates or 
plans the homicide before making the ultimate decision to kill.”). 
 22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980); see also Perkins, supra note 
19, at 449 (“Those who first employed th[e] word [premeditation] in this type of first degree 
murder statute undoubtedly had in mind a malicious scheme thought out well in advance of 
the fatal act itself.”); Wechsler & Michael, supra note 20, at 707–08 (observing that 
premeditation implies “some appreciable time prior to the homicide”). 
 23. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 776 n.4; see also Keith W. Blinn, First Degree Murder—
A Workable Definition, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 733 (1950) (“‘[P]remeditatedly’ 
has reference, as the literal meaning of the word implies, to having thought over the matter 
beforehand, and ‘deliberately’ pertains more to the manner of committing the act, or to the 
fact that its commission was determined upon in cold blood.”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 154 
(“To be guilty of first degree premeditated murder, the defendant must have deliberated 
and/or planned the killing . . . before making the decision to kill.”); Romero, supra note 2, at 
83 (“Only deliberation, in the sense that it means a mental process that involves careful 
thought and weighing of the facts and consequences, connotes a concept that is not 
necessarily included in the notion of intent.” (footnote omitted)). 
 Rollin Perkins pointed out that intent to kill need not precede the premeditation and 
deliberation: 
If one has pondered over the possibility of taking another’s life and has 
reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before a decision is reached, he may 
truly be said to have killed “wilfully, deliberately and premeditatedly,” 
although after his intent was fully formed he carried it into effect as rapidly as 
thought can be translated into action. 
Perkins, supra note 19, at 450. One might think of the actor’s mental state in the 
premeditation and deliberation phase in such a case as being one of conditional intent, by 
which the actor thinks, in essence: “I shall kill him if I decide it is to my advantage to do so.” 
See generally Gideon Yaffe, Conditional Intent and Mens Rea, 10 LEGAL THEORY 273 
(2004). 
 24. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 767; ROY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 207 
(1952) (“The word ‘premeditation’ . . . adds the requirement that th[e] weighing of alternate 
courses of action and the final decision must occur an appreciable length of time before the 
homicidal act is committed.”); Crump, supra note 7, at 348 (“[T]he requirement of 
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is thought to refer to the quality of the actor’s thoughts leading up to the fatal act—
a coolness of mind capable of such reflection.25 The idea of deliberation presumes a 
rational actor who “rais[es] considerations in favor of the [killing] and against it, 
and deliberat[es] between them.”26 
B. The Difficulties 
In practice, however, the premeditation-deliberation formula is not so neatly 
cabined.27 Rather, courts have tended to equate, either explicitly or implicitly, 
premeditation and deliberation with intent to kill, thus destroying any meaningful 
difference between first- and second-degree murder. This failure to define 
premeditation and deliberation in a meaningful fashion is, critics have charged, 
symptomatic of a deeper flaw in the premeditation-deliberation formula: it does not 
meaningfully distinguish between the very worst intentional killers and the 
“ordinary” murderer. That is to say, according to the critics, the distinction is 
neither clear nor principled.28 
1. Defining Premeditation and Deliberation 
Given how quickly the human mind works, there is a great deal of difficulty in 
distinguishing “premeditated and deliberate” killings from those that are merely 
intentional. As then–Chief Judge Cardozo wrote: “If intent is deliberate and 
premeditated whenever there is choice, then in truth it is always deliberate and 
premeditated, since choice is involved in the hypothesis of the intent.”29 Suzanne 
                                                                                                                 
premeditation . . . implies, at the very least, a need for some kind of prior mental focus.”); 
Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 77 (“Premeditation, in contrast to deliberation, requires ‘sufficient 
time’ to plan to carry out the killing.”). 
 25. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 31.03(C)(2), at 516; LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 766–
67; see also MORELAND, supra note 24, at 207 (“‘Deliberation’ . . . naturally means a rational 
process in which the mind weighs and considers alternative courses of conduct . . . .”); 
Mounts, supra note 2, at 299–300 (“The true test of premeditation and deliberation . . . [i]s 
not the duration of time as much as the extent of the reflection.”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 
155 (“[T]o deliberate means to consider, to think carefully.”); Stephanie M. Griffin, Note, 
Whether the Elements of Deliberation and Premeditation Adequately Distinguish First 
Degree Murder from Second Degree Murder: State v. Garcia, 24 N.M. L. REV. 437, 440 
(1994) (noting New Mexico jury instruction requiring that “a person must weigh and 
consider the act of killing before commencing th[e] act” in order for the jury to find 
deliberation). 
 26. Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 631. 
 27. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in LAW AND 
LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 70, 97 (1931) (“[O]n the face of the statute 
the distinction is clear enough. The difficulty arises when we try to discover what is meant 
by the words deliberate and premeditated.”); Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 645 (“The lack of 
clarity of the term ‘premeditation’ has drawn considerable criticism.”). 
 28. See Romero, supra note 2, at 76 (“Distinctions are principled in the sense that first 
degree murder includes killings that are more heinous than those killings encompassed by 
second degree murder. Distinctions are clear to the extent that they meaningfully 
differentiate the two degrees of murder . . . .”). 
 29. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 100; see also Crump, supra note 7, at 348 (“[A] concept 
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Mounts put the point more bluntly: “[T]here is no principled basis for 
distinguishing between an intentional killing and one that is premeditated and 
deliberated . . . .”30 Thus, many courts have held that premeditation and deliberation 
can occur in the instant before the act of killing.31 In these jurisdictions, “an 
intention to kill could be ‘deliberate’ even though it was not a product of calm 
reflection and ‘premeditated’ even though no appreciable time elapsed between the 
intention and the act.”32 Thus, “convictions for first degree murder have frequently 
been affirmed where such short periods of time [as a few seconds] were 
involved.”33 
                                                                                                                 
of instant premeditation undercuts the legislative distinction between the two degrees of 
murder.”); Hobson, supra note 2, at 520 (“Given the speed at which we think, and the 
relatively long time it takes for us to act on our thoughts, all intentional killers have thought 
about killing and then decided to kill the victim before the killing occurred.”); Romero, 
supra note 2, at 83 (“[T]he vagueness of the terms makes it difficult to identify which 
intentional killings are willful, deliberate and premeditated.”); Saraliene S. Smith, Note, It 
Can Happen in an Instant: Rethinking Pattern Instructions for Kansas on Premeditated 
Murder, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2006) (“Failing to provide jurors with a clear 
definition of premeditation opens the door for jurors to disregard the term altogether and, 
without the element of premeditation, first-degree premeditated murder is no different than 
second-degree intentional murder.”). 
 30. Mounts, supra note 2, at 266. 
 31. See CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 97 (“To deliberate and premeditate within the 
meaning of the statute, one does not have to plan the murder days or hours or even minutes 
in advance . . . .”);  DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 31.03(C)(3), at 517; Brenner, supra note 2, 
at 280 (noting that courts have “declar[ed] that the prerequisite mental operation may be 
completed in a period of time so slight as to be imperceptible”); Givelber, supra note 2, at 
381 (“Most courts did not require the passage of any appreciable time before the killing in 
order for the jury to find that the defendant had deliberated.”); Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the 
Dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts Murder Statute, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 245 
(2001) (“Generally, to premeditate does not require an extended time span but may be 
accomplished in a ‘matter of days, hours, or even seconds.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Tucker, 76 N.E. 127, 141–42 (Mass. 1905))); Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 637 
(“[P]remeditation can crystallize during a violent or fatal action.”); Ledewitz, supra note 2, 
at 77 (“[T]his is not planning in the conventional sense, for no minimum length of time is 
required.”); Arnold H. Loewy, Critiquing Crump: The Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Professor Crump’s Model Laws of Homicide, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 369, 371 (2007) (“[Some] 
states say there must be appreciable premeditation, but this simply means capable of being 
appreciated, and this can be a matter of seconds.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 296 
(“[P]remeditation and deliberation do not require any set amount of time . . . .”); Pauley, 
supra note 2, at 151 (observing that under many court decisions, “time is irrelevant to the 
issue of premeditation [and] [t]he defendant can premeditate in a very short time—in an 
instant, in fact”); Perkins, supra note 19, at 449 (“Premeditation means ‘thought of 
beforehand’ for some length of time, however short.” (quoting State v. Benson, 111 S.E. 
869, 871 (N.C. 1922))); Stacy, supra note 2, 1030 n.84 (“[M]any jurisdictions do not require 
that any appreciable time elapse between the formation and the execution of the intent to 
kill.”). 
 32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 125 (1980). 
 33. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 767; see also Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 86 (“Essentially, 
no time is too short for premeditation to be satisfied.”). 
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The difficulties with this position are manifest. Syntactically, “‘[p]remeditation’ 
that appears ‘instantaneously’ is an oxymoron.”34 As Matthew Pauley put it: 
If premeditated means thought about beforehand, it strains credulity to 
say that a murder can be premeditated in a fraction of a second. It 
strains it even more to say that such a murder is deliberate in the sense 
that the killer carefully weighed the alternatives with calmness and 
depth of thought.35 
If conviction for both first-degree and second-degree murder requires intent to kill, 
and all that distinguishes the former from the latter is the presence of premeditation 
and deliberation, but these can be formed seconds before the act of killing, then the 
distinction has effectively been obliterated.36 Thus, courts have included within the 
category of premeditated and deliberate murders those which are more readily 
classified as “hasty, impulsive, spur-of-the-moment action, and not the result of 
real and substantial reflection.”37 This is especially problematic in those states in 
which, absent a finding of premeditation and deliberation, the killer is ineligible for 
the death penalty. As Cardozo put it: “Upon the basis of this fine distinction with 
its obscure and mystifying psychology, scores of men have gone to their death.”38 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. Crump, supra note 7, at 275; accord Kealy, supra note 31, at 247 (“[I]s it possible 
for calm reflection and deliberation to be achieved in a moment?”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 
155 (“Can a murder be ‘premeditated and deliberate’ if the murderer ‘reflected’ for a split 
second before killing?”). 
 35. Pauley, supra note 2, at 155; see also Perkins, supra note 19, at 449 (“The notion 
that a fully formed intent is always deliberate and premeditated, no matter how short the time 
between the first thought of the matter and the execution of the plan, is preposterous.”). 
 36. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 125 (1980) (noting that this approach 
“blurs any distinction between the two categories of the offense”); DRESSLER, supra note 18, 
at 515 (observing that under this approach, “[n]early every intentional killing constitutes 
first-degree murder”); LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 767; Brenner, supra note 2, at 280 
(observing that the terms “have been construed in such a manner as to render meaningless 
the statutory distinction between first and second degree murder”); Griffin, supra note 25, at 
444 (“[A] murder in which the killer deliberated for just a few seconds is not clearly 
distinguishable from a murder in which the killer has acted upon a rash impulse.”); 
Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 654 (“If we make do with any sort of deliberation, even with a 
fleeting thought of the illegality of the action passing through the perpetrator’s 
consciousness, this blurs and neutralizes the distinction between premeditation and 
spontaneous intention.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 283–84 (“Depending on the time span 
required to engage in premeditation and deliberation, the distinction between a premeditated 
and deliberated intent to kill and a bare intent to kill can be described as somewhere between 
elusive and non-existent.”); Romero, supra note 2, at 83 (“To the extent that premeditation 
refers to a thought process between the intent to kill and the act of killing, this term applies 
equally to second degree murder since intent actuates conduct.”). 
 37. Brenner, supra note 2, at 280. 
 38. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 101; see also Mounts, supra note 2, at 327 (“Can any 
ephemeral difference that might exist have been intended to justify the determination of 
whether someone lived or died?”). 
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Some courts have even explicitly ruled that premeditation and deliberation 
require nothing more than intent to kill.39 These courts do not even make a pretense 
of distinguishing premeditated and deliberate murders from other intentional 
murders. In these jurisdictions, “once intent to kill is established, the existence of 
premeditation and, presumably, deliberation as well, are jury questions only.”40 
Cardozo thought the premeditation-deliberation formula best construed in this way, 
as a device by which the jury could use its common-sense judgment to distinguish 
more sympathetic murderers and spare them the death penalty: “What we have is 
merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the suddenness 
of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the 
exercise of mercy.”41 Nevertheless, he thought the distinction wrought by the 
premeditation-deliberation formula “much too vague to be continued in our law.”42 
He believed the mercy-dispensing power “should be given to them directly and not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 514 (observing that some courts treat premeditation 
and deliberation as “the intent to kill”); Brenner, supra note 2, at 281 (observing that 
Pennsylvania itself has taken this approach); Crump, supra note 7, at 287 (“Some 
jurisdictions . . . have compressed premeditation and deliberation into the lesser-included 
concept of intent.”); Hobson, supra note 2, at 516 (observing that in California at one time 
“premeditation was expanded to the point where simple specific intent to kill satisfied the 
premeditation and deliberation requirement”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 280 (asserting that 
one court’s “elaboration of the meaning of willful, deliberate, and premeditated suggested 
these terms were indistinguishable from the ‘deliberate intention’ of express malice”); 
Pauley, supra note 2, at 152 (“Under [one] interpretation, premeditation is exactly the same 
as intent to kill.”); Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 454 (observing that some “state courts view[ed] 
premeditation as nothing more than a ‘conscious purpose to bring about death’” (quoting 
Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 37–38 (Pa. 1976))); Stacy, supra note 2, at 1030 
n.84 (noting that in some jurisdictions, “the meaning of ‘premeditation’ has been equated 
with ‘intentional’ so that there is no meaningful analytical distinction between a 
premeditated intentional killing, which is first-degree murder, and an unpremeditated 
intentional murder, which is second-degree murder”). 
 40. Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 86; see also Mounts, supra note 2, at 324 (“[T]he court 
now seems to regard the category of premeditated and deliberated murders as a sort of 
‘catchall’ for murders that the court deems particularly reprehensible but that are not 
committed by one of the other means specified [by statute].”). 
 41. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 100; see also Brenner, supra note 2, at 285 (“[B]ecause 
of the vagueness of the distinction between first and second degree intentional murder, the 
second-degree murder provision is serving, not as a substantive definition of crime, but as a 
safety valve for juries which entertain doubts raised by considerations apart from the 
distinction between the two degrees of murderous intent . . . .”); Givelber, supra note 2, at 
381 (“[T]he premeditation and deliberation formula resulted in giving the jury unguided 
discretion to return first-degree murder.”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 163 (observing that “the 
lack of meaningful guidelines from the courts about when a murder is premeditated and 
when it is not . . . means that juries are left to use their own judgment as to what 
premeditation and deliberation mean in any particular case”); Romero, supra note 2, at 86 
(“[T]he jury [is] left to apply its own conception of what deliberate intention means.”). 
 42. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 99. 
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in a mystifying cloud of words.”43 Some modern commentators have agreed with 
this assessment.44 
This approach has serious flaws. First, unbridled jury discretion to decide to 
convict of a crime that paves the way for the death penalty,45 on the one hand, or 
one that is punishable only by little more than a dozen years in prison, on the other, 
verges on lawlessness.46 Such overly broad discretion can lead to unpredictable, 
inconsistent, undesirable, and even indefensible results.47 In addition, this approach 
fails miserably as an exercise in statutory interpretation.48 As Tom Stacy cogently 
observed: “The simultaneous departure from the text and the pretense of following 
it carry the troubling messages that courts are not bound by statutory text and that 
insincerity is an acceptable feature of judicial reasoning.”49 If we are to take 
statutory interpretation seriously, premeditation and deliberation must mean 
something more than mere intent. 
Other courts treat the premeditation-deliberation distinction more seriously and 
find that these words must, in practice as well as in theory, mean something more 
than simply intent to kill.50 For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals in People 
v. Morrin held: “While the minimum time necessary to exercise th[e] process [of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Id. at 100. 
 44. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 29, at 15 (urging that jurors be instructed that 
“premeditation is meant to reflect a higher level of culpability than second-degree intentional 
murder”). 
 45. Unlike in Cardozo’s time, a jury finding of premeditation and deliberation can no 
longer, by itself, automatically subject the killer to the death penalty. See Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (holding mandatory death penalty for premeditated and 
deliberate murder violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). However, in seventeen 
states, a defendant cannot be sentenced to death absent such a finding. See supra text 
accompanying note 14; see also Mounts, supra note 2, at 263 (“[A]lthough no longer in 
itself a basis for the imposition of the death penalty, conviction of first degree murder 
remains a necessary predicate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 46. See Mounts, supra note 2, at 263 n.7 (“[T]he imprecise definition of premeditation 
and deliberation . . . inevitably amplified the problem of unguided juror discretion by 
extending the possibility of a death sentence to a large segment of what, in theory, was 
second degree murder.”); see also Crump, supra note 7, at 275 (“Unguided discretion is the 
opposite of law; it is lawlessness.”). 
 47. See Crump, supra note 7, at 275 (“[D]iscretion manifests itself in arbitrary results, 
dissatisfied litigants, and lessened respect for law.”); Stacy, supra note 2, at 1070 (observing 
that overly broad discretion can lead to “inconsistent” and “indefensible” results). 
 48. See Crump, supra note 7, at 287–88 (observing that this approach “fails to give 
faithful meaning to the text written by the legislature”); accord PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 
101 (noting that premeditation and deliberation must mean something more than intent); 
Kealy, supra note 31, at 246–47 (“If premeditation simply means intent to kill, then there is 
no reason for a legislature to include modifiers such as premeditated, deliberate or willful for 
first-degree murder.”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 154 (“If premeditation is synonymous with 
intent to kill, why did the legislature choose to use the word premeditated instead of 
intentional?”). 
 49. Stacy, supra note 2, at 1032 n.91. 
 50. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 31.03(C)(3), at 517–18; Stacy, supra note 2, at 1071 
(“Some jurisdictions and some juries do hew to ‘premeditation’s’ ordinary meaning of 
planning.”). 
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premeditation and deliberation] is incapable of exact determination, the interval 
between initial thought and ultimate action should be long enough to afford a 
reasonable man time to subject the nature of his response to a ‘second look.’”51 
Commentators tend to applaud such a result.52 Yet this approach simply highlights, 
but does not resolve, the difficulties of giving the words “premeditation” and 
“deliberation” coherent and consistent meaning. Once one recognizes that some 
span of time is necessary for the existence of premeditation, one must decide the 
difficult question of how much time is sufficient.53 And once one gives serious 
weight to the quality of reflection implicit in the term “deliberation,” one must 
decide the nature of the reflection sufficient to constitute deliberation.54 
The true difficulty lies with instructing a lay jury to determine whether a killer 
premeditated and deliberated when there is no precise definition for those terms. As 
Cardozo wrote: “The . . . distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first 
time can fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it.”55 He added with 
admirable candor: “I am not at all sure I understand it myself . . . .”56 Neither courts 
nor commentators have been capable of resolving this question in any but the 
vaguest of ways.57 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. 187 N.W.2d 434, 449 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). 
 52. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 19, at 450 (“The sound interpretation of such a statute 
is that a killing is deliberate and premeditated if, and only if, it results from real and 
substantial reflection.”); Romero, supra note 2, at 86–87 (“The thought processes described 
in the definition of deliberate intention would seem to require some time. To engage in 
careful thought and to weigh the considerations for and against the proposed course of action 
that might result in a killing must involve the passage of time . . . .”). 
 53. See Hobson, supra note 2, at 516 (“While there is a temporal component to 
premeditation, it is inexact.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 327 (“From the beginning, th[e] issue 
of the time required to premeditate and deliberate has plagued any effort to distinguish these 
elements from the intent to kill.”). 
 54. Hobson, supra note 2, at 517 (“[I]t is extremely difficult to set guidelines for how 
much reflection is enough to demonstrate premeditation . . . .”). Blurring the lines even 
more, there may be yet a third category of killer between the impulsive and the deliberative: 
the seemingly impulsive killer who “conscious[ly] refus[es] to deliberate before causing 
harm.” Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 456 n.64. Such a classification would be akin to the 
problematic notion of “willful blindness,” which implicates something more than 
recklessness but something less than full knowledge. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, 
§ 10.04(B), at 128 (observing that a person acts with willful blindness with regard to the 
existence of a fact when he “is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in 
question[] and . . . deliberately fails to investigate in order to avoid confirmation of the 
fact”). 
 55. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 100; see also Blinn, supra note 23, at 733 (“[I]n 
practice it is impossible to explain to the lay jury with unerring accuracy these distinct and 
separate mental states requisite for first degree murder.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 284 (“If a 
killer can form this more aggravated mental state in a matter of moments, how can the jury 
differentiate aggravated intent to kill from non-aggravated intent to kill?”). 
 56. CARDOZO, supra note 27, at 100–01. 
 57. See FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 256 (“[A]fter over a century of litigation, the courts 
have not been able to settle upon a consistent interpretation of the test . . . .”); Crump, supra 
note 7, at 264 (“[T]he line that [the premeditation-deliberation formula] draws between first- 
and second-degree murder is vague, indeterminate, and shifting.”); Hobson, supra note 2, at 
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These difficulties are well illustrated by the West Virginia case of State v. 
Guthrie.58 Guthrie suffered from depression, borderline personality disorder, panic 
attacks, and body dysmorphic disorder, causing him to be obsessed with his nose.59 
The victim, who worked with Guthrie in a restaurant, teased Guthrie and snapped 
him with a wet dishtowel several times, once striking him on the nose.60 Guthrie 
removed the gloves he was wearing, removed a knife from his pocket, started 
toward the victim, and stabbed him once in the neck, killing him.61 At Guthrie’s 
trial for first-degree murder on a premeditation-deliberation theory, the jury was 
instructed that premeditation and deliberation simply meant that the killing was 
intentional.62 Guthrie was convicted.63 The Supreme Court of West Virginia 
determined that the jury instruction erroneously conflated intent to kill with 
premeditation and deliberation.64 However, the court made clear that a properly 
instructed jury could have found Guthrie guilty of first-degree murder, because 
Guthrie might have premeditated and deliberated in the time it took him to remove 
his gloves, take out his knife, and walk toward the victim.65 Indeed, the court 
approved a jury instruction that “[a]ny interval of time between the forming of the 
intent to kill and the execution of that intent, which is of sufficient duration for the 
accused to be fully conscious of what he intended, is sufficient.”66 
2. Justifying the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula 
The difficulty in defining premeditation and deliberation, critics of the formula 
charge, is not its greatest flaw. This difficulty, they argue, has come about because 
courts stretch the concepts of premeditation and deliberation in order to cover truly 
abhorrent murders that are not, strictly speaking, premeditated and deliberate. 
Courts are reluctant to consign some unpremeditated or nondeliberate murders to 
the category of second-degree murder when they are of the type that constitutes the 
very worst intentional murders. That this practice is so pervasive demonstrates, the 
critics charge, that the premeditation-deliberation formula is inadequate to separate 
first- from second-degree murder for the simple reason that there is little if any 
                                                                                                                 
514 (1996) (“[T]he requisite cold-bloodedness is very difficult to define . . . .”). For 
examples of vague articulations of the test, see Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 654 (“The 
correct path . . . requires a significant process of deliberation but does not require hours of 
deliberation.”); Perkins, supra note 19, at 450 (“It is true the law does not attempt to set a 
period of time for this requirement in terms of hours, or minutes or even seconds; but 
premeditation takes ‘some appreciable time.’” (quoting State v. Zdanowicz, 55 A. 743, 746 
(N.J. 1903))); Romero, supra note 2, at 87 (“[T]he jury instruction should define deliberation 
so as to include sufficient time for the careful thought and weighing of the considerations for 
and against the killing.”); Engels, supra note 18, at 1403 (“[T]he test for premeditation does 
not consider the duration, but rather the extent of the reflection.”). 
 58. 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995). 
 59. Id. at 172. 
 60. Id. at 171. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 179. 
 63. Id. at 171. 
 64. Id. at 181–83. 
 65. Id. at 176. 
 66. Id. at 182–83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2011] NOT THE CRIME BUT THE COVER-UP 893 
 
correlation between the presence of premeditation and deliberation of the murder, 
on the one hand, and the dangerousness and culpability of the offender, on the 
other.67 As the Commentary to the MPC charged, the “judicial inconsistency and 
obscurity” in interpreting the premeditation-deliberation formula “are largely 
symptomatic of the lack of an intelligible policy underlying the . . . formulation.”68 
The difficulty, the critics charge, is that the premeditation-deliberation formula 
is not carefully calibrated to separate out the worst murderers because the presence 
of planning activity is at best a rough proxy for the most heinous killings.69 The 
premeditation-deliberation formula, therefore, is both over- and underinclusive.70 
On the one hand, it elevates to first-degree murder planned killings that, for one 
reason or another, evoke our understanding if not our sympathy.71 On the other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. See, e.g., Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 650 (“It may be that certain minimalist 
interpretations that have dramatically narrowed [the] meaning [of premeditation] . . . derive 
from an objection to the element itself . . . .”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 267 (suggesting the 
possibility “that, regardless of the theoretical feasibility of drawing a distinct line” between 
murders that are premeditated and deliberate and those that are not, “it has not been drawn 
because the court[s] [are] not convinced of its correlation to culpability”); Pillsbury, supra 
note 5, at 454 (“We might see what courts have done with premeditation . . . as a covert 
move to find room for motivation analysis.”); Romero, supra note 2, at 92 (suggesting that 
confused application of the premeditation-deliberation formula “reflects the judgment that 
deliberation does not identify the worst murders”); Stacy, supra note 2, at 1031 (asserting 
“that many courts are diluting the statute’s plain meaning” because of “discomfort with the 
conclusion that premeditation is the sine qua non of killings that deserve the most severe 
punishment”). 
 68. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 126 (1980). 
 69. See Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 647 (noting the criticism that “[t]he distinction that 
is based on the existence or the absence of premeditation does not differentiate deeds on a 
solid, justifiable, moral basis”). For examples of this critique, see Hobson, supra note 2, at 
514 (asserting that the types of killings covered by first-degree murder statutes “do not 
necessarily warrant more punishment”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 166 (“Premeditation is 
simply not a good way to distinguish first from second degree murder.”); Romero, supra 
note 2, at 83 (“Willful, deliberate and premeditated homicides do not necessarily include the 
most heinous killings that deserve the greater punishment reserved for first degree murder.”). 
 70. See Crump, supra note 7, at 264 (opining that the premeditation-deliberation 
formula “sometimes gets it backward, punishing lesser crimes more severely and 
depreciating the seriousness of more blameworthy offenses”); Givelber, supra note 2, at 382 
(“[C]ritics objected that the presence of premeditation did not necessarily signal that the 
defendant was in the class of the most morally blameworthy killers while its absence did not 
necessarily mean that the defendant was not in that class.”); Stacy, supra note 2, at 1011 (“In 
defining the most serious category of intentional homicides, [the traditional paradigm] 
overlooks aggravating circumstances whose importance surpasses that of premeditation as 
well as the mitigating significance premeditation itself sometimes possesses.”). 
 71. See Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 648 (noting the criticism that the premeditated 
killer might be “worthy of less blame by virtue of the fact that he considered, during the 
process of deliberation, inhibiting and restraining factors . . . , that he has a conscience, and 
that his inhibitions against wrongdoing are active . . . in contrast with a killer evincing a 
complete lack of conscience or a total dullness of moral sense”). For examples of this 
critique, see Crump, supra note 7, at 278–79 (asserting that the premeditation-deliberation 
formula results in “murders that arguably are less blameworthy” being punished more 
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hand, it treats less seriously those murders deemed unplanned, at least by courts 
that take the distinction seriously, yet which evoke the full measure of our 
disgust.72 
a. Overinclusiveness of the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula 
The overinclusiveness of the premeditation-deliberation formula was cogently 
summarized by the MPC Commentary. In a widely cited passage, the Commentary 
eloquently explained why some premeditated murders may, in fact, be among the 
most sympathetic: “Prior reflection may reveal the uncertainties of a tortured 
conscience rather than exceptional depravity. The very fact of a long internal 
struggle may be evidence that the homicidal impulse was deeply aberrational and 
far more the product of extraordinary circumstances than a true reflection of the 
actor’s normal character.”73 The Commentary provides as examples of planned-out 
but sympathetic murders “most mercy killings[,] . . . suicide pacts, many 
infanticides, and cases where a provocation gains in its explosive power as the 
actor broods about his injury.”74 
                                                                                                                 
severely); Givelber, supra note 2, at 383 (“[T]he very act of considering whether to kill 
might suggest that the decision to take life was uncharacteristic or might suggest that the 
killing was undertaken with good motives, as in a mercy killing.”); Kealy, supra note 31, at 
252 (“[I]t has become clear that certain premeditated killings may be deemed 
‘understandable’ by the general public, and deserve a lesser sentence . . . .”); Mounts, supra 
note 2, at 296–97 (“[T]he existence of premeditation and deliberation—that is, of 
forethought and consideration of alternatives—[i]s not in all cases necessarily correlated 
with a high level of moral turpitude.”); Romero, supra note 2, at 93 (“Mercy killings and 
some family homicides following deep emotional struggles do not seem to present the same 
depravity exhibited by the contract slayer.”). 
 72. See Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 647–48 (noting the criticism that the premeditation-
deliberation formula favorably treats “those who do not even consider inhibiting 
considerations because of their . . . general lack of morality” and “whose degree of 
dangerousness is no less, and in some cases may be higher, than that of the premeditated 
killer”). For examples of this critique, see Crump, supra note 7, at 278 (arguing that the 
premeditation-deliberation formula results in “[h]ighly blameworthy crimes . . . being 
categorized merely as second-degree [murders]”); Kealy, supra note 31, at 248 (“[M]any 
unpremeditated killings shock society’s conscience more than premeditated murders.”); 
Pauley, supra note 2, at 165 (“[S]ome of the worst murders are not planned at all.”); 
Romero, supra note 2, at 93 (“[T]he willful, deliberate and premeditated basis excludes very 
grave murders from the first degree murder category that deserve the maximum 
punishment.”). 
 73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980); see also PILLSBURY, supra 
note 2, at 99 (arguing that the premeditation-deliberation formula is “overbroad, permitting 
the classification of too many killings in the worst offense category”); Stacy, supra note 2, at 
1032 (“[T]he traditional paradigm fails to appreciate that compelling mitigating 
circumstances sometimes accompany premeditation and that premeditation itself sometimes 
possesses mitigating significance.”). 
 74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980); accord Kealy, supra note 31, 
at 249 (“One form of premeditated killing, mercy killing, society may not view as 
particularly ‘blameworthy.’”); Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 632 (“[I]t is proper to distinguish 
between one who acted coolly from worthy motives, and one who acted heatedly from 
unworthy motives . . . .”). 
2011] NOT THE CRIME BUT THE COVER-UP 895 
 
The textbook example of the arguable overinclusiveness of the premeditation-
deliberation formula is the North Carolina case of State v. Forrest.75 Forrest visited 
his father, who was hospitalized, terminally ill, untreatable, near death, and with a 
“Do Not Resuscitate” order in place.76 When a nurse attempted to comfort Forrest, 
he replied: “Go to hell. I’ve been taking care of him for years. I’ll take care of 
him.”77 After Forrest was left alone with his father in the hospital room, Forrest 
killed his father with four gunshots to the head from a single-action revolver, 
meaning that the gun had to be cocked each time it was fired.78 Shortly thereafter, 
he admitted to the police that he had put his father “out of his suffering” and that he 
had “promised [his] dad [he] wouldn’t let him suffer.”79 Forrest was convicted of 
first-degree murder,80 requiring that the jury find premeditation and deliberation 
pursuant to North Carolina law.81 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, 
finding sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation in Forrest’s taking the 
gun to the hospital, the lack of provocation by the victim, his statements to the 
nurse just before the killing, and, especially, his statements to the police 
thereafter.82 
On a retributivist view, Forrest hardly seems like he is among the most 
blameworthy of killers.83 While he intentionally ended the life of another human 
being, and therefore (absent a defense of euthanasia) deserves punishment as a 
murderer, his act would likely be classified by reasonable people as among the least 
heinous of murders. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his belief that he 
acted in order to relieve the suffering of his father. Moreover, death appeared close 
at hand and Forrest’s actions only hastened what likely would have come about 
naturally within days or even hours. Finally, the homicidal act was designed to, and 
did, result in instantaneous death, avoiding the infliction of undue physical or 
psychological suffering on the victim. 
Likewise, from an incapacitationist standpoint, Forrest seems to be among the 
least dangerous of killers. His act was a once-in-a-lifetime, out-of-character 
response to an extraordinary situation. Seen in this light, the chances of Forrest ever 
killing again appear to approach nil.84 And, again, the lack of any physical or 
psychological harm inflicted on the victim demonstrates that Forrest’s character 
was hardly that of a cold-hearted sadist. 
Yet, on a conventional view of the premeditation-deliberation formula, the 
determination of the North Carolina Supreme Court was most assuredly correct. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987). 
 76. Id. at 253. 
 77. Id. at 254. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West 2000). 
 82. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d at 258. 
 83. See Stacy, supra note 2, at 1033 (“From a retributivist perspective, Forest’s [sic] 
premeditated mercy killing of his father constituted a qualitatively less serious infringement 
of autonomy than [an] unpremeditated but brutal killing of [a] child . . . .”). 
 84. See id. at 1034 (“Forest [sic] hardly can be viewed as posing great dangers to others 
unless incarcerated.”). 
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Whether premeditation and deliberation can be measured in seconds or only in days 
and hours, the fact that Forrest brought a gun to a hospital room sealed his fate.85 
His act was planned and calculated; it was premeditated and deliberate under any 
definition of those terms. 
One might argue that the overinclusiveness problem is largely illusory. After all, 
virtually every critic of the premeditation-deliberation formula who comments on 
its overinclusiveness cites a single case: Forrest.86 Thus, it may well be that true 
mercy killings are rarely prosecuted as first-degree murders and that, when they 
are, juries seldom convict of that charge.87 Even if both of these propositions are 
true, however, this does not necessarily detract from the overinclusiveness problem. 
That prosecutors might wisely exercise their discretion, and juries understandably 
exercise mercy, with regard to more sympathetic killers does not take away from 
the fact that such killers are, in fact, guilty of first-degree murder and could be 
punished accordingly. Indeed, it is precisely because prosecutors and juries have 
few if any real guidelines to follow in determining which murders are premeditated 
and deliberate that arbitrariness might result. 
Moreover, Suzanne Mounts has identified another category of murders with 
regard to which the premeditation-deliberation formula is overinclusive: those 
where the killer is afflicted with a mental disease or defect, but one of insufficient 
severity to render him legally insane.88 She notes that the existence of 
premeditation and deliberation presupposes normally functioning cognitive 
abilities.89 Yet, in a person afflicted with a mental illness, “cognitive abilities [do 
not] necessarily correlate with culpability.”90 This is because, modern 
psychological theory surmises, “mental illness can often leave cognitive abilities 
unaffected, while seriously undermining emotional and volitional capacities.”91 It is 
true that a first-degree murder defendant suffering such impairments might well 
have an expert testify that he92 might not have had the capacity to deliberate in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See id. at 1033 (suggesting that Forrest probably “did ‘premeditate’ the killing,” 
given his “prior motive to kill” and the fact that he “carried a concealed pistol into the 
hospital”). 
 86. E.g., Kealy, supra note 31, at 249 n.344 (discussing Forrest); Pauley, supra note 2, 
at 164–65 (discussing Forrest); Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 454 & n.60 (citing Forrest). 
 87. See Neil P. Cohen, Thoughts on Professor Crump’s Comparison of Traditional 
American Homicide Law and the Model Penal Code, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 357, 363 (2007) 
(“One reason for this lack of authority is that, in reality, states with a Pennsylvania model 
may well not produce anomalous results with any frequency.” (emphasis omitted)); 
Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 652 (“[C]riticism of premeditation always repeats the same 
opposite examples, which clearly reflect a category that is very limited, numerically 
speaking, and atypical, qualitatively speaking.”). 
 88. See Mounts, supra note 2, at 298. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; see also Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 454 & n.59 (asserting that the premeditation-
deliberation formula is overinclusive because it has been held to apply even to those 
suffering from PCP intoxication and organic brain injury). 
 91. Mounts, supra note 2, at 298. 
 92. This Article uses the male pronoun when referring to a particular hypothetical 
murderer because the overwhelming majority of murderers are male. See Office of Justice 
Programs, Homicide Trends in the U.S.: Trends by Gender, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
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full sense of the word, despite his unimpaired cognitive capabilities. Nevertheless, 
there is no guarantee that a jury will credit such testimony, especially in the face of 
the contrary testimony of a prosecution expert witness. 
b. Underinclusiveness of the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula 
The second criticism of the premeditation-deliberation formula is that it is 
underinclusive. That is, critics charge, murders that are unplanned are often among 
the most reprehensible and their perpetrators among the most dangerous. 
In 1883, James Fitzjames Stephen wrote perhaps the earliest and most famous 
criticism of the use of premeditation as the dividing line between more serious and 
less serious murders. Stephen was actually discussing not the 1794 Statute but the 
French Code, which, according to him, punished most murders with life 
imprisonment but which punished by death four general classes of aggravated 
murders, including those “aggravated by premeditation or waylaying,” where 
premeditation was “defined as a preconceived design.”93 Stephen decried the 
irrationality of separating premeditated from non-premeditated murder on the basis 
of the increased gravity of the former: “As much cruelty, as much indifference to 
the life of others, a disposition at least as dangerous to society, probably even more 
dangerous, is shown by sudden as by premeditated murders.”94 Stephen, in a widely 
cited passage, proceeded to give several examples of impulsive murders that 
intuitively seem as bad as, if not worse than, planned murders: 
[1] A., passing along the road, sees a boy sitting on a bridge over a deep 
river and, out of mere wanton barbarity, pushes him into it and so 
drowns him. [2] A man makes advances to a girl who repels him. He 
deliberately but instantly cuts her throat. [3] A man civilly asked to pay 
a just debt pretends to get the money, loads a rifle and blows out his 
creditor’s brains. In none of these cases is there premeditation unless 
the word is used in a sense as unnatural, as ‘aforethought’ in ‘malice 
aforethought,’ but each represents even more diabolical cruelty and 
ferocity than that which is involved in murders premeditated in the 
natural sense of the word.95 
Nearly a century later, the Commentary to the MPC, in defending the Code’s 
elimination of degrees of murder, famously repeated this criticism. Relying heavily 
on Stephen, the Commentary argued that many impulsive murders will be more 
abhorrent than many premeditated murders: “[S]ome purely impulsive murders will 
present no extenuating circumstance[s]. The suddenness of the killing may simply 
reveal callousness so complete and depravity so extreme that no hesitation is 
required.”96 
                                                                                                                 
(2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/gender.cfm (indicating that 88.8% of all 
homicide offenders between 1976 and 2005 were male). 
 93. 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 93 
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883). 
 94. Id. at 94. 
 95. Id. 
 96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980).  
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Other prominent commentators have echoed these sentiments. George Fletcher 
has noted that murders that are planned, especially those involving ambush or lying 
in wait, have always been seen as “particularly heinous.”97 However, Fletcher 
further observed, “while planning and calculation represent one form of heinous or 
cold-blooded murder, premeditation is not the only feature that makes intentional 
killings wicked.”98 Utilizing Stephen’s examples, Fletcher noted that it is the very 
absence of thought or foresight that makes some killings so atrocious: “Wanton 
killings are generally regarded as among the most wicked, and the feature that 
makes a killing wanton is precisely the absence of detached reflection before the 
deed.”99 Fletcher concluded that the premeditation-deliberation formula is 
underinclusive: “[T]here is obviously a flaw in the criterion of ‘premeditation and 
deliberation.’ It takes one of several grounds that are sufficient to treat a homicide 
as among the most wicked, and takes that one ground to be necessary to the 
exclusion of all others.”100 Likewise, Samuel Pillsbury has written: “Premeditation 
assumes that the worst wrongs involve the most extended, dispassionate 
consideration of wrongdoing, and while this is often so, it is not always.”101 And 
Tom Stacy has weighed in: “[I]mpulsive as well as premeditated killings can 
evidence the highest degree of disrespect for others.”102 
The poster child for the underinclusiveness of the premeditation-deliberation 
formula is a California case, People v. Anderson.103 After several days of heavy 
drinking, Anderson killed the ten-year-old daughter of his live-in girlfriend while 
he was alone with the victim in their home.104 The victim suffered over sixty stab 
wounds, including some to her vaginal and rectal areas.105 Blood was found in 
almost every room of the house and on Anderson’s clothes, and bloody footprints 
the size of the victim’s feet were discovered going from room to room.106 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 253. 
 98. Id. at 254. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 99; see also Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 455 (“[A]n 
impulsive killing, depending on motivation, may present a more culpable offense than a 
reflective killing by a brooding, self-doubting offender.”). 
 102. Stacy, supra note 2, at 1028.  
 103. 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968); see, e.g., PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 104 (opining that 
Anderson “leads us to doubt whether an impassioned decision to kill is necessarily less 
culpable than a dispassionate one”); Hobson, supra note 2, at 521 (“Anderson . . . is an 
excellent example of a murder far worse than many premeditated killings.”); Ledewitz, 
supra note 2, at 108 n.163 (“[R]eliance on a requirement of planning in first degree murder 
cases has failed in the past.” (citing Anderson)); Mounts, supra note 2, at 303–04 (“The 
problem with the result in Anderson, if there is one, results from the legislative definition of 
first degree murder.”); Pauley, supra note 2, at 160 (citing Anderson for the proposition that 
a strict approach to the premeditation-deliberation formula “leads to odd results . . . where 
brutal murderers are not punished to the maximum extent that the law allows for their 
heinous crimes”). An exhaustive analysis of Anderson is contained in Crump, supra note 7, 
at 265–83. 
 104. Anderson, 447 P.2d at 944–45. 
 105. Id. at 945. 
 106. Id. 
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victim’s dress and underpants, with the crotch torn out, were found torn and 
bloodied, but, importantly, there was no evidence of sexual assault.107 Anderson 
was found guilty of first-degree murder, requiring a finding of premeditation and 
deliberation under California law, and sentenced to death.108 On appeal, the 
California Supreme Court reduced the conviction to murder in the second degree, 
based on the insufficiency of evidence of premeditation and deliberation.109 
Just as Forrest’s moral culpability approached the nadir of that of all intentional 
murderers, so was Anderson’s somewhere near its zenith. Anderson brutally and 
senselessly murdered a ten-year-old girl with over sixty stab wounds. The bloody 
footprints and other evidence indicated that he likely chased his victim throughout 
the house as she bled to death. That he tore off her clothes, ripped the crotch from 
her panties, and inflicted stab wounds to her genital region indicate perhaps that he 
took some perverse sexual pleasure in the pain and suffering he was inflicting.110 It 
is not a stretch of the English language to characterize the girl’s murder as an act of 
torture. Anderson’s actions demonstrate sheer wanton barbarity and disregard for 
the young life he snuffed out. 
Likewise, Anderson’s dangerousness seems to follow inexorably from his moral 
depravity. For if Anderson was capable of this torturous murder of a young 
innocent, either with a motive stemming from his sexual deviance, or with no 
motive at all, it is reasonable to assume that Anderson might try to kill again. And 
since he chose as his victim one who is among society’s most vulnerable, he would 
stand a high likelihood of succeeding.111 In short, both our moral intuitions and a 
reasoned utilitarian calculus tell us that Anderson should suffer the most severe 
punishment permitted by law. 
At the same time, the California Supreme Court’s decision seems correct, at 
least upon any meaningful view of the premeditation-deliberation formula.112 There 
was no evidence that the murder was planned out beforehand for any appreciable 
length of time. Rather, it seems to have been the result of a spur-of-the-moment 
burst of rage. Unless we are to either invent facts that do not appear in the record, 
or contort the meaning of premeditation and deliberation to include an intention 
formed in the instant before the commencement of the homicidal act, or after the 
act’s commencement but before the fatal blow was struck,113 we must conclude that 
Anderson’s act was unpremeditated and nondeliberate. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 943–44, 946–47. 
 109. Id. at 947–53. 
 110. Pauley, supra note 2, at 160 (“The jury might have believed that the defendant’s act 
was part of a deliberate, if bizarre, plan to achieve sexual gratification.”); Pillsbury, supra 
note 5, at 455 (“The case involved . . . circumstances which strongly suggested a sexual 
motivation, a crime that ranks high on an intuitive scale of homicide offenses.”). 
 111. See Mounts, supra note 2, at 303 (“The murder was particularly violent and 
unprovoked, and the victim was a vulnerable child.”). 
 112. See id. (“[I]n terms of the court’s application of the statute, it is hard to argue with 
the decision.”); Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 455 (“[T]he court took seriously the notion that 
premeditation requires cool calculation and a carefully reflected-upon decision to kill.”). 
 113. See Mounts, supra note 2, at 316 (observing that, arguably, “with each stab or blow, 
the perpetrator again decided to inflict a deadly wound and thus premeditated and 
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II. POSSIBLE PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE  
PREMEDITATION-DELIBERATION FORMULA 
Virtually all who have written about the premeditation-deliberation formula 
begin from the same retributivist premise: that the formula exists to punish more 
blameworthy murderers more severely. Some also assume that the formula is 
additionally based on the incapacitationist function of punishing more dangerous 
killers more severely. None has adequately examined the possibility that the 
formula is supported also by the rationale of deterrence. 
A. Retribution and Incapacitation 
Critics of the premeditation-deliberation formula almost uniformly begin from 
the premise that the formula is grounded in retributivist theory. Retributivism posits 
that criminal punishment is justified by the moral culpability of the criminal 
actor.114 According to this assumption, the formula is designed to capture the very 
worst murderers—that is, the formula presumes that those who plan out their 
killings are categorically worse than those who kill intentionally but on impulse. 
Thus, George Fletcher wrote: “The historic function of this formula is determining 
whether the murder is sufficiently heinous to be subject to the extreme penalty of 
death.”115 Likewise, Samuel Pillsbury wrote that “[p]remeditation assumes that the 
worst wrongs involve the most extended, dispassionate consideration of 
wrongdoing.”116 The ALI, in its Commentary to the MPC, agreed: “[The formula] 
probably rests on the premise that there exists some dependable relation between 
the duration of reflection and the gravity of the offense. Crudely put, the judgment 
is that the person who plans ahead is worse than the person who kills on sudden 
impulse.”117 And Daniel Givelber has written: “Premeditation and deliberation 
treat[] the premeditated murderer as more depraved than one who kill[s] on 
impulse.”118 In short, the premeditation-deliberation formula is designed essentially 
to “serve[] as a proxy for the worst motives to kill.”119 When we know the offender 
                                                                                                                 
deliberated on the act of killing,” but that “Anderson itself is an example of a case in which 
such an argument apparently was made and rejected”). At least one commentator seems to 
support this position. See Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 637 (“What starts as a violent or 
harmful assault . . . can, during the execution, become premeditated action.”). 
 114. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 2.03(B)(1), at 16. 
 115. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 253. 
 116. PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 99; see also id. at 100 (observing that in the 
premeditation-deliberation formula, “we find the idea that a cool and preconceived design to 
kill is the hallmark of the worst form of homicide”). 
 117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980). 
 118. Givelber, supra note 2, at 382. 
 119. PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 100; see also DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 514 (positing 
that “the division of murder into degrees is meant to separate the most heinous forms of 
murder” from others); MORELAND, supra note 24, at 208 (“[A] ‘deliberate’ killing is a more 
opprobrious offense than an ‘intentional’ one since it is a weighed act.”); Blinn, supra note 
23, at 735 (“The basis of the distinction between the degrees of murder is one of severity of 
punishment whereby the punishment may be adapted to the heinousness of the act.”); 
Hobson, supra note 2, at 526 (“Murder was originally divided into degrees to keep less 
culpable murderers from being subject to capital punishment.”); Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 
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has killed for what we believe to be a truly abhorrent motive, “we are confident that 
the soul of the offender is truly and fully evil” and that “the death penalty may be 
inflicted.”120 
Even those few scholars who are more sympathetic to the premeditation-
deliberation formula make this assumption about the formula’s retributivist 
foundation. Mordechai Kremnitzer, for example, writes that a killing performed 
after deliberation “is more blameworthy” because the perpetrator, unlike the 
intentional but spontaneous killer, had to overcome the “obstacles . . . [of] 
contradictory considerations and inhibitions” before acting.121 And Neil Cohen, 
after accepting “the notion that homicide law should permit actors to be sorted 
according to their moral blameworthiness,” finds that the premeditation-
deliberation formula is a suitable way of doing so.122 
That so many who have written on the issue presume that the premeditation-
deliberation formula is grounded in retributivism is surely due in no small part to 
the fundamental structure of the criminal law, and homicide law in particular. As 
Suzanne Mounts writes: “[T]he most characteristic feature of the modern homicide 
scheme [is] its hierarchical structure of culpability.”123 This feature represents the 
heavy influence of the MPC, with its “hierarchy of four carefully defined mental 
states.”124 This structure treats intentional conduct as more morally blameworthy 
than reckless conduct, which is in turn more morally blameworthy than negligent 
conduct.125 
Some commentators have asserted that, in addition to retributivist concerns, the 
utilitarian goal of incapacitation also drives the premeditation-deliberation formula. 
Incapacitationist theory posits that the primary purpose of punishment is to 
physically prevent the criminal actor from committing further offenses.126 The 
contention is that the killer who premeditates and deliberates is not only more 
culpable, but is also more dangerous, than the killer who merely kills intentionally. 
Thus, one student commentator wrote that the “introduction of premeditation into 
the criminal law reflects society’s belief that a killer acting according to a 
preconceived plan is more dangerous, more culpable, and less capable of 
reformation than an impulsive killer.”127 Mordechai Kremnitzer agrees: 
                                                                                                                 
81 (“Presumably, th[e] division was made along the lines of mental states in order to identify 
the most culpable killers.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 289 (“[F]irst degree murder obviously 
must reflect markedly greater blameworthiness than . . . that of second degree murder.”); 
Romero, supra note 2, at 76 (“[T]he division of homicides . . . reflects the view that . . . [t]he 
more reprehensible the homicide, the greater the punishment the killing should warrant.”). 
 120. Ledewitz, supra note 2, at 82. 
 121. Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 641. 
 122. Cohen, supra note 87, at 360–62; see also Loewy, supra note 31, at 370 (“All other 
things being equal, a preconceived intentional killing in cold blood is more blameworthy 
than an instantaneous unintentional hot blooded killing.”). 
 123. Mounts, supra note 2, at 264; see also Cohen, supra note 87, at 360 (“[S]caling 
moral blameworthiness is exactly what homicide law is all about . . . .”). 
 124. Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 457. 
 125. See Givelber, supra note 2, at 422 (observing that “[t]he distinctions between intent, 
recklessness, negligence, and pure accident permeate the criminal law,” in large part because 
“choice underlies any theory of desert”). 
 126. DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 2.03(A)(2), at 15. 
 127. Walther, supra note 21, at 357; accord Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d 213, 214 
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“[H]omicide following cold blooded deliberation may indicate a particularly 
dangerous perpetrator.”128 In addition, the act itself may be more dangerous 
because planned-out acts are more likely to be successful than unplanned acts.129 
B. What the Commentators Overlook: Deterrence 
While commentators have focused primarily on the supposed retributivist 
justifications, and secondarily on incapacitationist justifications, for the 
premeditation-deliberation formula, only a few have observed that the formula can 
also potentially be defended on deterrence grounds. Those who have done so, 
however, discuss only a simplified view of deterrence that does not advance the 
resolution of the formula’s fundamental pragmatic difficulty: defining what 
“premeditation and deliberation” means in the context of an intentional killing. A 
more sophisticated deterrence-based approach to the premeditation-deliberation 
formula would more precisely define the class of intentional killers who are most 
deterrable as those who, we can say with a high level of confidence, have thought 
about the consequences of their actions. Such an approach has great potential for 
both explaining this problematic doctrine and helping courts apply it in a coherent 
way. 
1. The Simple Case for Deterrence 
Deterrence theory posits that criminal punishments are designed primarily “to 
convince the general community to forego criminal conduct in the future.”130 The 
simple case for a deterrence-based view of the premeditation-deliberation formula 
was explained by Tom Stacy: “It is said that deterrence supports an increased 
penalty for premeditated killings on the ground that those who deliberate 
beforehand might include the added penalty in their deliberative calculus and be 
deterred by it.”131 Stacy found fault with this rationale, however, on two grounds. 
                                                                                                                 
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (observing that the distinction “reflect[s] a belief that one who meditates an 
intent to kill and then deliberately executes it is more dangerous, more culpable or less 
capable of reformation than one who kills on sudden impulse”). 
 128. Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 644; see also Stacy, supra note 2, at 1027 (discussing 
and rejecting “the need for incapacitation” as a possible justification for the premeditation-
deliberation formula). 
 129. Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 634–35 (“In general, a well planned deed is more 
dangerous than a deed that is not well planned.”). 
 130. DRESSLER, supra note 18, § 2.03(A)(2), at 15 (emphasis omitted); see also ANDREW 
VON HIRSCH, ANTHONY E. BOTTOMS, ELIZABETH BURNEY & P-O. WIKSTRÖM, CRIMINAL 
DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 5 (1999) 
(defining deterrence “as the avoidance of a given action through fear of the perceived 
consequences”). 
 131. Stacy, supra note 2, at 1026; see also Bullock, 122 F.2d at 214 (observing that the 
distinction between premeditated murder and other murders “reflect[s] a belief that . . . the 
prospect of the death penalty is more likely to deter men from deliberate than from impulsive 
murder”); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT 
IN CRIME CONTROL 106 (1973) (“[W]e can assume that persons guided by impulse rather 
than judgment, premeditation, or reflection are by definition less likely to be restrained by 
threats because they are less likely to reflect on the consequences of their act.”). 
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First, he doubted that a marginal increase in penalty would have any effect on the 
rational killer: “Will many offenders really reason that a killing is worth 
committing if the expected penalty is, say, only fifteen years instead of twenty-
five?”132 Second, Stacy repeated the assertion that unpremeditated or nondeliberate 
killers are often more dangerous, and therefore more in need of incapacitation, than 
those who premeditate and deliberate.133 Since incapacitation and deterrence are 
both utilitarian goals, the argument goes, the increased deterrence value in 
punishing premeditated and deliberate killers more harshly is effectively canceled 
out by the increased incapacitationist justification for punishing impulsive killers 
more harshly.134 
Stacy’s first objection is valid only if first-degree murder is punished merely by 
adding prison time to the punishment for second-degree murder. However, the 
difference in punishment awaiting first- and second-degree murderers, at least as 
contemplated by the 1794 Statute, is not a difference of degree but one of kind. 
Even those skeptical of the marginal deterrence effect of increased sentence 
severity acknowledge that such an effect is most probable where sentence severity 
crosses a “threshold” from one type of punishment to another.135 Thus, asking 
whether potential premeditated and deliberate killers will be more effectively 
deterred by the prospect of a greater prison term is the wrong question. The 
question is rather whether they will be more effectively deterred by the prospect of 
death rather than imprisonment. 
Stacy’s second contention is also not compelling. First, his assertion is unproved 
and unprovable, in large part because the social benefits to be expected from 
incapacitation and deterrence are both immeasurable and incommensurable. One 
cannot gauge just how much social benefit in terms of either deterrence or 
incapacitation can be expected from a particular penal sanction. And even if one 
could, it remains to be seen whether one “unit” of incapacitation is a fair trade for 
one “unit” of deterrence. Stacy also errs by assuming that just because some 
unpremeditated or nondeliberate murderers will be more dangerous than some 
premeditated and deliberate murderers, the typical unpremeditated or nondeliberate 
murderer will be more dangerous than the typical premeditated and deliberate 
murderer. After all, the underinclusiveness argument appears to be that impulsive 
murderers are often more dangerous than premeditated murderers, not that they 
invariably are. The real question is whether, assuming an impulsive murderer and a 
premeditated murderer are equally dangerous (and culpable), do considerations of 
deterrence support a heftier sentence for the latter? Stacy supplies no reason to 
answer that question in the negative. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Stacy, supra note 2, at 1027. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. (“The utilitarian school of thought, which includes considerations of 
incapacitation as well as general deterrence, does not support punishing premeditated 
killings more harshly as a category than impulsive ones.”). 
 135. E.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 209 (“Movements from fines to jail, 
or from county jail to state penitentiary, in that they involve crossing a ‘threshold,’ might 
produce increasing rather than diminishing returns.”); see also VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra 
note 130, at 7–8 (discussing the significance to deterrent effect of crossing “thresholds”). 
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2. The Problem with the Simple Case for Deterrence 
The real problem with the deterrence rationale suggested above is that it does 
not support a distinction between intentional killings and those that are not only 
intentional but also premeditated and deliberate. It is true that “[o]ne should have 
the greatest control over what one does purposely, and signalling [sic] that the most 
severe punishment awaits those who purposely violate the law should discourage 
such conduct.”136 Yet this proves too much, for all intentional killings are done 
“purposely,” while only those occasioned also by premeditation and deliberation 
are punished the most severely. 
The simple deterrence rationale would be a workable justification for the 
premeditation-deliberation formula if those who premeditate and deliberate are 
deterrable while those who do nothing more than intend to kill are not. But such a 
claim is doubtful, for the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. Intentional 
but impulsive killers are deterrable to at least some extent; they are simply not as 
deterrable as those who premeditate and deliberate. Herbert Wechsler and Jerome 
Michael made exactly this point in their classic work on the law of homicide: 
[D]eliberation may proceed for a longer or shorter time and is more or 
less thorough depending upon (a) the number of relevant desires which 
are considered and the prudence with which their satisfaction is 
appraised as means to happiness; (b) the accuracy with which probable 
consequences are foreseen; (c) the accuracy with which the adaptation 
of means to end is determined. The less thorough the deliberation, the 
more “impulsive” the act.137 
That is to say, though some intentional murders are more deliberate than others, 
there is no such thing as a wholly nondeliberate intentional murder. Guthrie,138 for 
example, had some opportunity, however fleeting, to contemplate the consequences 
of his actions in the moment between his forming of the intent and his execution of 
the action.139 
                                                                                                                 
 
 136. Givelber, supra note 2, at 422. 
 137. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 20, at 734 n.139; see also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, 
supra note 131, at 107 (asserting that Wechsler and Michael saw the distinction between 
deliberateness and impulsivity “as primarily one of degree”). 
 138. Guthrie stabbed and killed his coworker after the coworker teased him about his 
nose. See supra text accompanying notes 58–66. 
 139. It is true that, absent a confession, we can never know whether Guthrie took 
advantage of that opportunity and actually did contemplate the consequences of his actions. 
However, the same can be said of the killer who acts hours, days, or weeks after forming the 
intent to kill. See Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 633 (“The process of weighing considerations 
in favor and against homicide are hidden to the beholder, and extremely difficult to prove.”). 
Nonetheless, given the gravity of the choice to be made, we are justified in inferring that one 
who had the opportunity to contemplate the consequences of the decision to kill did, in fact, 
do so, at least absent any indication to the contrary. See id. (“The decision to kill is such a 
significant decision that one can assume that if there were time and ability to deliberate 
whether to kill, the perpetrator would have deliberated the matter.”). 
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It follows that even impulsive murderers are deterrable, at least to some extent. 
As Wechsler and Michael concluded, “the creation of [a] motive [to obey the law] 
may . . . lead . . . excitable men to control their excitement.”140 The level of 
deterrence to be expected from proscriptions against intentional killings, like the 
level of deliberation attendant to any particular intentional killing, is simply a 
matter of degree. 
At the same time, homicide in general is less susceptible to deterrence than 
many other crimes.141 For one thing, proscriptions against killing based on moral 
and religious doctrine run deep—in a way that proscriptions against tax evasion do 
not—and therefore probably have a deterrent effect that obviates much of the 
purported deterrent effect of the penal sanction for homicide.142 That is to say, most 
of us are deterred from killing by our moral and religious sensibilities more so than 
by the law against murder; and most of the remainder are not deterred by either. For 
another thing, crimes such as homicide are typically driven by emotion rather than 
by a cool, rational calculus.143 This is significant because “very high degrees of 
emotional arousal may eclipse thoughts of future consequences by riveting all of 
the potential criminal’s attention on his present situation.”144 Finally, murder can be 
generally characterized as an expressive crime, “where the act itself is what the 
potential criminal wants,” as opposed to an instrumental crime, one that is merely a 
means to some other end, such as financial gain.145 Penal sanctions naturally have a 
greater deterrent effect with respect to instrumental crimes, where other criminal or 
noncriminal behavior can be substituted to achieve a like result, than expressive 
crimes, where the crime is an end in itself.146 
This is not to say that homicides are generally not deterrable. “[T]he fact that 
deterrence is more difficult with respect to some offenses does not mean that 
changes in the credibility or severity of threats will not result in marginal 
deterrence in these cases.”147 It is only to point out that the simple deterrence 
rationale discussed above greatly exaggerates the relative deterrability of planned 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 20, at 736 (emphasis omitted); see also ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 107 (“Wechsler and Michael do not draw the conclusion that 
impulsive behavior is nondeterrable.”); Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects 
of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 968 (1966) (“Even in an emotional crime like 
murder, with all its pathological elements, it would be untenable to claim that the magnitude 
of the punishment has no effect whatsoever.”). 
 141. See Herbert L.A. Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the 
United States, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 459 (1957) (“In all countries murder is committed to a 
very large extent either by persons who, though sane, do not in fact count the cost, or are so 
mentally deranged that they cannot count it.”). 
 142. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 132–34; Andenaes, supra note 140, at 
967 (“[M]urder in our culture is surrounded by massive moral reprobation.”). 
 143. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 129. 
 144. Id. at 136. 
 145. See id. at 138–39 (citing William J. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the 
Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 703, 708). Of course, murder can be an 
instrumental crime according to this typology, as when one murders a competitor for some 
business advantage, or a spouse for the life insurance proceeds. 
 146. See id. at 139. 
 147. Id. at 140. 
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as opposed to impulsive murders. It does so not only by understating how 
deterrable impulsive killings are relative to premeditated and deliberate killings, but 
also by overstating how deterrable premeditated and deliberate killings are in 
general. 
Thus, it seems that a deterrence-based rationale for the premeditation-
deliberation formula suffers from the same fundamental defects as the retributivist 
or incapacitationist rationales that have been roundly criticized. First, as a 
justificatory matter, since deliberateness, and therefore deterrability, exists only on 
a sliding scale, the notion of premeditation and deliberation can act only as a rough 
proxy for the killer’s deterrability, just as it could act only as a rough surrogate for 
his dangerousness and moral depravity. If “premeditation and deliberation” is 
defined in any robust manner, one will always be able to point to killings on the 
“impulsive” side of the arbitrary line between deliberate and impulsive killings that 
might have been subject to the marginal deterrent effect of an increase in 
punishment. 
Second, as a definitional matter, we still have the problem of just where to place 
that arbitrary line. Once we view deliberateness, and therefore deterrability, as a 
spectrum rather than a binary choice, there is no reasoned explanation that is 
immediately apparent for placing the distinction between deliberateness and 
impulsivity at any particular point on that spectrum. And since even the most 
impulsive but intentional murderer is deterrable, if only to the slightest extent, and 
since deterrence is a social benefit that eludes accurate measurement, judges will 
inevitably give in to the hydraulic pressure of moving the line closer and closer to 
the killing. The result is the same as it has been under a regime in which the 
premeditation-deliberation formula has been justified on retributivist and 
incapacitationist grounds: since the formula coincides with its underlying rationale 
only in a very approximate way, it will be defined into oblivion. 
3. A More Sophisticated View of Deterrence 
We cannot conclude that a more severe penalty for a planned murder is justified 
on the ground that those who plan their murders will be deterred while those who 
kill impulsively will not. As shown above, such a view suffers much the same 
defects as other purported justifications for the premeditation-deliberation formula. 
That is, it dramatically oversimplifies the relative deterrability of premeditated as 
opposed to impulsive killers, and it fails to give guidance as to how much pre-
planning, and of what quality, should qualify for more severe treatment.  
If a justifiable and workable dividing line, based on deterrence grounds, between 
premeditation and impulsivity eludes us, perhaps it is because we are asking the 
wrong question. Instead of seeking to define that class of intentional killers who are 
the most deterrable, we can reframe the question more broadly: under what 
circumstances is enhanced punishment for some intentional killers but not others 
justifiable based on grounds of deterrence? Framing the question in this way avoids 
the pitfall in thinking that the deterrent effect of a given punishment will 
necessarily vary proportionally with punishment severity. Rather, it allows us to 
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take into account the two other critical variables in the equation of deterrence: 
certainty of punishment and swiftness of punishment.148 
The consensus among penologists and criminologists over the last two centuries 
has been that the certainty of punishment is a critical factor in deterring crime.149 
Some have gone so far as to say “that if punishment could be made certain almost 
all crime would be eliminated.”150 Most agree that the certainty of punishment is a 
stronger indicator of the expected deterrent effect than punishment severity.151 Of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 71 (2005) 
(“General deterrent effects depend on a number of factors . . . [including] the severity of the 
penalty; the swiftness with which it is imposed; [and] the probability of being caught and 
punished . . . .”); see also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 195 (cautioning against 
viewing punishment severity as the “price” of crime, an increase in which should depress 
demand, given that “the price of a product is a sure condition of purchase, while the 
incidence of consequences threatened for an offense will be only occasional”). 
 149. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(“[D]eterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the penalty but upon its 
certainty . . . .”); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 161; Andenaes, supra note 140, at 
960 (“[T]he degree of risk of detection and conviction is of paramount importance to the 
preventive effects of the penal law.”); Frase, supra note 148, at 72 (“Research has found that 
offenders are more sensitive to the probability of punishment than to its severity.”); see also 
VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 130, at 47 (“The current research . . . indicates that there are 
consistent and significant negative correlations between likelihood of conviction and crime 
rates . . . . [S]uch a pattern is at least consistent with an hypothesis of marginal deterrence 
with respect to certainty of punishment.” (citation omitted)); Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in 
Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81 J. POL. ECON. 521, 547 
(1973) (finding that probability of apprehension and punishment correlated negatively with 
crime commission to a greater extent than punishment severity for murder, rape, and 
robbery); David P. Farrington, Patrick A. Langan & Per-Olof H. Wilkström, Changes in 
Crime and Punishment in America, England and Sweden Between the 1980s and 1990s, 3 
STUD. ON CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 104, 127 (1994) (“[T]he most important correlate of 
the change in the survey crime rate in these data is the change in the probability of an 
offender being convicted.”); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of 
Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 741 (1989) 
(“[W]e find that certainty of punishment has an important deterrent effect.”). 
  Zimring and Hawkins justifiably caution against drawing too definitive a conclusion 
from the studies that have been performed. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 167–71. 
For example, many of the studies involve relatively low-level crime with relatively low-level 
punishment consequences. Zimring and Hawkins leave open the very question that concerns 
us here: whether “variations in risk of severe penalties, such as the death penalty and life 
imprisonment, function in this context in the same way as variations in the risk of 
encountering fines.” Id. at 171. 
 150. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 161 (quoting L. Radzinowicz, Preface to 
F.H. MCCLINTOCK & EVELYN GIBSON, ROBBERY IN LONDON: AN ENQUIRY BY THE 
CAMBRIDGE INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOGY, at x (1961)); see also STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A 
REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS 
SERVICE COMMITTEE 53 (1971) (“[T]here is widespread belief in the proposition that a high 
likelihood of getting caught is a more potent deterrent than a high severity of penalty . . . .”). 
 151. See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 130, at 5 (“[M]ost earlier studies have suggested 
that certainty has substantially the stronger general deterrent effect [than severity].”); 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 161; Andenaes, supra note 140, at 964 (“[I]t has 
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course, since we are looking at the deterrent effect in the mind of the potential 
criminal, the subjective appreciation of the possibility of punishment, not the actual 
possibility, is the determinative factor.152 But the two are directly related, for as the 
objectively real risk of punishment increases, the subjective assessment of the risk 
usually will as well.153 And of course, when we speak of the risk of punishment, we 
are necessarily including the risks of detection and apprehension.154 
Penologists also agree that swiftness of punishment is very important in 
achieving a desired deterrent effect of the penal sanction. It is commonly accepted 
that people sharply discount pains that are not to be experienced until the distant 
future.155 This is especially true of those most likely to commit crime.156 
Accordingly, “[t]hreats of punishment in the distant future are not as a rule as 
important in the process of motivation as are threats of immediate punishment.”157 
Johannes Andenaes concluded that the “certainty of rapid apprehension and 
punishment would prevent most [criminal] violations.”158 
                                                                                                                 
been commonly accepted that the certainty of detection and punishment is of greater 
consequence in deterring people from committing crimes than is the severity of the 
penalty.”). 
 152. See VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 130, at 6 (“The subjective character of deterrence 
is one of its most important characteristics . . . .”); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 
162; Andenaes, supra note 140, at 963 (“The decisive factor in creating the deterrent effect 
is . . . not the objective risk of detection but the risk as it is calculated by the potential 
criminal.”). 
 153. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 164. 
 154. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 42 (1990) (“[R]esearch suggests 
that certainty of apprehension and punishment most strongly influences behavior . . . .”); 
VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 130, at 6 (“‘Certainty’ should be used to refer to the 
likelihood of being caught, and made liable to punishment, given commission of an offence. 
In practice, this ordinarily means the likelihood of being arrested and convicted.” (citations 
omitted)); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 196; Andenaes, supra note 140, at 961 
(“[L]awlessness may flourish when the probability of detection, apprehension and conviction 
is low.”). 
 155. See Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes 
Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479, 481 (1975) (describing “time discounts” 
by those considering the threat of long prison terms); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–4 (1999) (“The disutility that a person experiences from imprisonment in 
any future year might be discounted to the present at some positive rate.”). 
 156. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 155, at 4 n.5 (“[O]ne might expect that those 
individuals in the population who are most present oriented would gravitate toward crime, 
since the discounted expected disutility of sanctions is lower for them than for others.”). 
 157. Andenaes, supra note 140, at 961 n.21; accord VON HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 130, 
at 48 (“There is a general tendency to discount contingent future costs—and to the extent 
that potential offenders are more oriented to immediate satisfactions, this tendency is 
heightened.”). Despite the intuitive appeal of this hypothesis, there has been little research on 
the effects of swiftness of punishment as a factor in deterrence. See id. at 5 n.††. 
 158. Andenaes, supra note 140, at 961 (emphasis omitted). 
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4. The Virtue of Parsimony 
A final concept—parsimony—must be discussed in order to fully understand a 
deterrence-based approach to the premeditation-deliberation formula. The principle 
of parsimony, a concept coined by Norval Morris, is that “[t]he least restrictive 
(punitive) sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes should be 
imposed.”159 Parsimony is a quintessentially utilitarian concept160 that looks to both 
the benefits achieved by punishment and the costs it imposes on society and the 
individual.161 Parsimony is also a humane impulse,162 for any punishment meted out 
beyond that which is necessary to serve its utilitarian goals would amount to the 
unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering.163 Thus, the goal for the humane 
utilitarian is to make the penal sanction severe enough to achieve its desired ends, 
but no more severe than that.164 
III. LOOKING TO DETERRENCE THEORY TO UNDERSTAND THE  
PREMEDITATION-DELIBERATION FORMULA 
These basic precepts of utilitarian penal theory—and especially the critical 
nature to the deterrence equation of the probability and swiftness of detection, 
apprehension, and punishment—were famously propounded by Enlightenment 
thinkers Cesare Beccaria and Baron Montesquieu in the decades before the 
American Revolution. Pennsylvanians who were largely responsible for the 
revolutionary 1794 Statute were well-versed in Beccaria’s and Montesquieu’s 
views, often parroting them in their own works. This view of deterrence provides 
the missing explanation for the premeditation-deliberation formula and greatly aids 
in our understanding of the 1794 Statute and its descendents. 
A. A Closer Look at the 1794 Pennsylvania Statute 
To say that the drafters of the 1794 Statute were heavily influenced by Beccaria 
and Montesquieu would be an understatement. The works of these two architects of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59 (1974); see also Frase, supra 
note 148, at 68 (defining parsimony as “a preference for the least severe alternative that will 
achieve the purposes of the sentence”). 
 160. See Frase, supra note 148, at 77 (referring to parsimony as a “utilitarian principle of 
necessity and efficiency”); Hart, supra note 141, at 450 (“Clearly it is part of a sane 
utilitarianism that no punishment must cause more misery than the offense unchecked . . . .” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 161. See Frase, supra note 148, at 72 (“Criminal penalties should not cost more than the 
benefits they achieve or cause individual or social harms which outweigh their crime-
controlling effects or other benefits. . . . Penalties should not be more severe or more costly 
than necessary . . . .”). 
 162. Id. at 77 (referring to parsimony as “a humane . . . principle”). 
 163. See MORRIS, supra note 159, at 61 (“[A]ny punitive suffering beyond societal need 
is, in this context, what defines cruelty.”). 
 164. See Andenaes, supra note 140, at 965 (“[F]or those who wish to make the criminal 
law more humane the problem is one of determining how far it is possible to proceed in the 
direction of leniency without weakening the law’s total preventive effects.”). 
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deterrence theory virtually drove Pennsylvania to adopt the 1794 reform. Their 
handiwork can be seen both in the run-up to the statute and the structure of the 
statute itself. 
1. The Pennsylvania Revolution 
To fully understand the 1794 Statute, one must go back thirty years earlier, to 
the 1764 publication of Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments,165 a 
manifesto of deterrence theory, recognized by some as “the most important book of 
the century on penal law.”166 Beccaria took the classic utilitarian position that the 
primary goal of the criminal law was the forward-looking one of preventing crime 
rather than the backward-looking one of punishing crime.167 This was largely to be 
brought about through specific and general deterrence, influencing the offender, 
through the imposition of punishment, to be law-abiding in the future and 
encouraging others, through the threat of punishment, to do the same.168 
Beccaria forcefully set forth the notion that the certainty of punishment mattered 
far more for deterrence purposes than punishment severity, writing that “[o]ne of 
the most effective brakes on crime is not the harshness of its punishment, but the 
unerringness of punishment.”169 He elaborated: 
The certainty of even a mild punishment will make a bigger impression 
than the fear of a more awful one which is united to a hope of not being 
punished at all. For, even the smallest harms, when they are certain, 
always frighten human souls, whereas hope . . . holds at bay the idea of 
larger harms, especially when it is reinforced by frequent examples of 
the impunity accorded by weak and corrupt judges.170 
Here he echoed the words of Montesquieu who wrote: “If we enquire into the 
cause of all human corruptions[,] we shall find that they proceed from the impunity 
of crimes, and not from the moderation of punishments.”171 
Beccaria was equally forceful in his assertion that the swiftness of punishment 
was critical for purposes of achieving the desired deterrence effect. As he put it: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard 
Bellamy ed., Richard Davis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764). 
 166. Marcello Maestro, Benjamin Franklin and the Penal Laws, 36 J. HIST. IDEAS 551, 
554 (1975); see also John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, 
America’s Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 204–
15 (2009) (discussing the widespread influence of Beccaria’s work); Albert Post, Early 
Efforts to Abolish Capital Punishment in Pennsylvania, 68 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 38, 
38 (1944) (referring to Beccaria’s book as “epoch-making”). 
 167. See BECCARIA, supra note 165, at 103 (“It is better to prevent crimes than to punish 
them.”). 
 168. See id. at 31 (“The purpose [of the penal sanction], therefore, is nothing other than 
to prevent the offender from doing fresh harm to his fellows and to deter others from doing 
likewise.”).  
 169. Id. at 63. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 1 M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 122 (1750). 
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“The swifter and closer to the crime a punishment is, the juster and more useful it 
will be . . . because the smaller the lapse of time between the misdeed and the 
punishment, the stronger and more lasting the association in the human mind 
between the two ideas crime and punishment.”172 In contrast, delay between crime 
and punishment tends to weaken the connection between the two in the minds of 
those who are the targets of the law’s deterrent message.173 
Beccaria also espoused the principal of parsimony. Punishment should be 
administered, he explained, only to the extent that is necessary to deter criminal 
conduct.174 Because punishment is an evil to be avoided to the extent possible, the 
object of the penal law should be to inflict the types and amounts of punishments 
that will “make the most efficacious and lasting impression on the minds of men,” 
while, at the same time, inflicting “the least torment to the body of the 
condemned.”175 In particular, though Beccaria was generally opposed to capital 
punishment, he allowed that death could be an appropriate punishment for a crime, 
but only if the death of the culprit “is the true and only brake to prevent others from 
committing crimes.”176 
Beccaria’s impact on this side of the Atlantic cannot be overstated. According to 
Adolph Caso, On Crimes and Punishments was “more influential than any other 
single book” during the 1770s and 1780s.177 According to one study, Beccaria was 
the sixth most cited secular source during the period from 1760 to 1805.178 During 
the 1770s, citations to Beccaria accounted for one percent of all citations to 
published sources; in the 1780s, the figure rose to three percent.179 A full one-third 
of all American libraries from 1777 to 1790 had at least one copy of On Crimes 
and Punishments.180 
Beccaria’s impact was especially great in Pennsylvania.181 An English edition of 
On Crimes and Punishments was published in Philadelphia no later than 1778.182 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. BECCARIA, supra note 165, at 48–49 (emphasis in original). 
 173. Id. at 49 (“[I]n unsophisticated minds . . . [a] long delay only serves to separate these 
two ideas further . . . .”). 
 174. Id. at 68 (“If a punishment is to be just, it must be pitched at just that level of 
intensity which suffices to deter men from crime.”). 
 175. Id. at 31; see also Frase, supra note 148, at 78 (observing that the “concept of 
parsimony . . . has been strongly promoted by utilitarian philosophers as far back as 
Beccaria”). 
 176. BECCARIA, supra note 165, at 67. 
 177. ADOLPH CASO, WE THE PEOPLE . . . : FORMATIVE DOCUMENTS OF AMERICA’S 
DEMOCRACY 264 (1995). 
 178. Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-
Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 193 (1984). Montesquieu 
was first. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Bessler, supra note 166, at 207 n.79. 
 181. Referring to Pennsylvania, Bradford wrote: “[A]s soon as the principles of Beccaria 
were disseminated, they found a soil that was prepared to receive them.” BRADFORD, supra 
note 2, at 137. 
 182. See Michael Kraus, Eighteenth Century Humanitarianism: Collaboration Between 
Europe and America, 60 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 270, 273 (1936); Post, supra note 
166, at 38. Caso contends that an edition was published in Philadelphia two years earlier. 
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The influence of this treatise can be seen in the works of three men deeply involved 
in the reform of Pennsylvania penal law in the late eighteenth century: James 
Wilson, professor at what is now the University of Pennsylvania Law School and 
Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, who in 1790 delivered a lecture 
entitled The Necessity and Proportion of Punishments;183 Benjamin Rush, professor 
of clinical medicine at the University of Pennsylvania,184 who published An 
Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals, and upon Society 
in 1787185 and Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing Murder 
by Death in 1792;186 and William Bradford, Attorney General of Pennsylvania from 
1780 to 1791, who published An Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death Is 
Necessary in Pennsylvania in 1793.187 
Wilson, Rush, and Bradford each espoused the utilitarian view of Beccaria and 
Montesquieu that the goal of the criminal law is to prevent crime. Bradford, for 
example, began his pamphlet this way: “The general principles upon which penal 
laws ought to be founded appear to be fully settled. Montesquieu and Beccaria led 
the way in the discussion . . . .” 188 According to Bradford, it had become axiomatic 
and was “no longer considered as the subject[] either of doubt or demonstration[] 
‘[t]hat the prevention of crimes is the sole end of punishment . . . .’”189 Wilson 
wrote succinctly: “The end of criminal jurisprudence is the prevention of 
crimes.”190 Rush began his 1787 Enquiry with the observation that punishment is 
                                                                                                                 
CASO, supra note 177, at 307. 
 183. See Keedy, supra note 2, at 768; Homer T. Rosenberger, James Wilson’s Theories of 
Punishment, 73 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45, 45 (1949). 
 184. See Keedy, supra note 2, at 768. 
 185. BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON 
CRIMINALS, AND UPON SOCIETY (1787), reprinted in REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW IN 
PENNSYLVANIA: SELECTED ENQUIRIES 1787–1819 (Morton J. Horwitz & Stanley N. Katz 
eds., 1972). 
 186. BENJAMIN RUSH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF PUNISHING 
MURDER BY DEATH (1792), reprinted in REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA: 
SELECTED ENQUIRIES 1787–1819, supra note 185. Rush has been directly linked to the 1794 
Statute. See Bessler, supra note 166, at 233. 
 187. Editor’s Introduction to BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 122. Bradford had an especially 
influential role in the penal reform of 1794. See JOB R. TYSON, ESSAY ON THE PENAL LAW OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 30 (1827) (giving Bradford credit for the 1794 legislation); Post, supra note 
166, at 40 (“Bradford . . . was the moving force behind the Pennsylvania statute of 1794 . . . 
.”). 
 188. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 126. Of course, the notion that the debate between 
utilitarianism and retributivism as the proper basis for the penal sanction was “fully settled” 
in 1793 appears laughable today. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1282 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) 
(“Although punishment has been a crucial feature of every developed legal system, 
widespread disagreement exists over the moral principles that can justify its imposition.”). 
 189. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 126 (emphasis omitted). 
 190. 3 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 3 (Bird Wilson ed., 
1804) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 357 (relating instruction to grand jury that “[t]o 
prevent crimes is the noblest end and aim of criminal jurisprudence” and that this was “the 
strongest” or even “the sole argument for the infliction of punishments”). 
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designed to effect the utilitarian goals of reformation, general deterrence, and 
incapacitation.191 
Each also set forth Beccaria’s and Montesquieu’s view that the certainty of 
punishment was far more important than the severity of punishment in deterring 
crime. Indeed, Bradford placed Montesquieu’s quote to that effect192 on the very 
cover of his pamphlet.193 Inside, he wrote that “[t]he prospect of escaping detection 
and the hopes of an acquittal or pardon, blunt [the] operation” of the law,194 and 
that “the imagination is soon accustomed to overlook or despise the degree of the 
penalty, and . . . the certainty of it is the only effectual restraint.”195 Rush cited 
Beccaria for the proposition that “where certainty has taken the place of severity of 
punishment, crimes have evidently and rapidly diminished.”196 And Wilson wrote: 
The certainty of punishments is a quality of the greatest importance. . . . 
When a criminal determines on the commission of a crime, he is not so 
much influenced by the lenity of the punishment, as by the expectation, 
that, in some way or other, he may be fortunate enough to avoid it.197 
Wilson also emphasized Beccaria’s point that the swiftness of punishment is 
more critical than its severity, so that punishment be viewed by those to be deterred 
as the inexorable consequence of the crime. In Wilson’s words: 
 The principles both of utility and of justice require, that the 
commission of a crime should be followed by a speedy infliction of the 
punishment.  
 . . . When a penalty marches close in the rear of the offence . . . an 
association, strong and striking, is produced between them, and they are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. RUSH, supra note 185, at 3. 
 192. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 193. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 124 (“If we enquire into the cause of all human 
corruptions, we shall find that they proceed from the impunity of crimes, and not from the 
moderation of punishments.” (quoting MONTESQUIEU, supra note 171, at 122)). 
 194. Id. at 130. 
 195. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 196. RUSH, supra note 186, at 10 (emphasis omitted); RUSH, supra note 185, at 14 
(“[T]he certainty of punishment operates so much more than its severity . . . in preventing 
crimes.” (emphasis in original)). 
 197. THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D., supra note 190, at 36; see 
also id. at 357 (“There are, in punishments, three qualities, which render them fit preventives 
of crimes. The first is their moderation. The second is their speediness. The third is their 
certainty.”); Rosenberger, supra note 183, at 60 (“Wilson held the view that laxity in 
enforcement of the law has more influence on a person contemplating crime than does mild 
punishment.”). It is notable also that Blackstone had this to say about Beccaria: “It is the 
sentiment of an ingenious writer, who seems to have well studied the springs of human 
action, that crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than by the severity, of 
punishment.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17 (emphasis in original). 
Blackstone’s influence among lawyers and lawmakers of the early American republic cannot 
be overstated. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 4–6 (1996) (discussing Blackstone’s influence on early American jurists and lawyers, 
including James Wilson). 
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viewed in the inseparable relation of cause and effect. When, on the 
contrary, the punishment is procrastinated to a remote period, this 
connexion is considered as weak and precarious, and the execution of 
the law is beheld and suffered as a detached instance of severity, 
warranted by no cogent reason, and springing from no laudable 
motive.198 
Rush and Bradford each also parroted Beccaria’s views on parsimony. Rush, 
favorably quoting Empress Catharine II of Russia, wrote: “That a punishment . . . 
might be conformable with justice, it ought to have such a degree of severity as 
might be sufficient to deter people from committing the crime.”199 Bradford posited 
as an axiom “[t]hat every punishment which is not absolutely necessary for th[e] 
purpose [of preventing crime] is a cruel and tyrannical act.”200 In particular, 
Bradford set forth Beccaria’s view that death should be utilized as a punishment 
rarely if at all. Bradford wrote that if the goals of incapacitation and general 
deterrence could “be obtained by any penalty short of death, to take away life, in 
such case, seems to be an authorized act of power.”201 
Beccaria’s views, filtered through the likes of Bradford,202 Wilson,203 and 
Rush,204 found their way into Pennsylvania law. “In the years preceding the 
American Revolution, Pennsylvania had witnessed the growth of a movement for 
reform of the penal law generally and for moderation of punishments in 
particular.”205 In 1776, Pennsylvania adopted a new constitution, section 38 of 
which called for the legislature to reduce the infliction of capital punishment and 
replace it in some cases with punishments more proportionate to the offense: “‘The 
penal laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed by the future Legislature of this 
State, as soon as may be, and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and 
in general more proportionate to the crimes.’”206 Section 39 continued this theme 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D., supra note 190, at 34; see 
also Rosenberger, supra note 183, at 59 (observing that Wilson “mentions that punishment 
should be dealt out quickly following commission of the offense”). 
 199. RUSH, supra note 186, at 12. 
 200. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 126 (emphasis omitted). 
 201. Id. at 128–29. 
 202. See id. at 126 (citing Beccaria in the second sentence of his pamphlet); see also 
Bessler, supra note 166, at 210 (noting that Bradford’s work “echoed many of Beccaria’s 
arguments”); Post, supra note 166, at 40 (“Bradford showed himself to be a true disciple of 
Beccaria, [Englishman John] Howard, and Montesquieu.”). 
 203. See THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D., supra note 190, at 9, 
13 (citing Beccaria); see also Bessler, supra note 166, at 209 (“Wilson . . . was thoroughly 
enamored with Beccaria’s ideas.”); Rosenberger, supra note 183, at 46 (“James Wilson’s 
writings indicate that he was familiar with . . . Beccaria and others on the subject of 
punishment.”). 
 204. See RUSH, supra note 186, at 10, 13 (citing Beccaria); see also MAESTRO, supra note 
2, at 140 (observing that Rush was influenced by Beccaria); Bessler, supra note 166, at 209 
(“Rush . . . was . . . an admirer of Beccaria’s work.”); Post, supra note 166, at 41 (“The 
arguments used by Rush were almost wholly those of Beccaria.”). 
 205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 123 (1980). 
 206. Keedy, supra note 2, at 766–67 (quoting PA. CONST. § 38 (1776)). 
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by calling upon the legislature to create prisons so as to both make capital 
punishment less necessary and enhance the deterrent value of punishment by 
placing imprisoned felons in full view of the public for long periods of time.207 
A decade later, the Pennsylvania legislature heeded the instructions of the state 
constitution and “abolished the death penalty for robbery, burglary, sodomy and 
buggery,”208 leaving death as a punishment only for “murder, rape, arson, and 
treason.”209 In its place, the state implemented the punishment of hard labor, at first 
in public and later in the penitentiary.210 On February 22, 1793, scarcely seven 
weeks after Bradford’s pamphlet was printed in its entirety in the Journal of the 
Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,211 the Pennsylvania Senate passed 
the resolutions that would become the 1794 legislation.212 The purpose of the 
reform was to limit the use of capital punishment.213 The pertinent resolution 
provided “that all murder perpetrated by poison or by lying in wait, or by any kind 
of wilful, premeditated and deliberate killing, shall be deemed murder in the first 
degree, and all other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree.”214 Ten 
months later, no legislative action having been taken, a committee of the 
Pennsylvania Senate, with Bradford’s help, drafted a substantially similar bill.215 
On January 29, 1794, a provision was added deeming any murder “committed in 
the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson[,] rape[,] robbery[,] or burglary” 
murder in the first degree as well.216 On April 22, 1794, Pennsylvania enacted the 
legislation (the “1794 Act”) that, among other things, revolutionized the law of 
homicide by dividing murders into degrees and limiting capital punishment to 
murder in the first degree.217 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. See id. at 767 n.66 (“To deter more effectually from the commission of crimes, by 
continued visible punishment of long duration, and to make sanguinary punishments less 
necessary, houses ought to be provided for punishing by hard labor, those who may be 
convicted of crimes not capital, wherein the criminals shall be employed for the benefit of 
the public, or for reparation of injuries done to private persons. And all persons at proper 
times shall be admitted to see the prisoners at their labor.” (quoting PA. CONST. § 39 
(1776))). 
 208. Id. at 767; see also Act of Sept. 15, 1786, ch. 1241, § 1, 12 Pa. Stat. at Large 280, 
280–81. 
 209. MAESTRO, supra note 2, at 138. 
 210. Id. at 138–39. 
 211. See Editor’s Introduction to BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 122 (reporting that 
Bradford’s pamphlet was “printed in full in the Journal of the Senate for January 5, 1793”). 
 212. See Keedy, supra note 2, at 770–71. 
 213. Givelber, supra note 2, at 380 (observing that Pennsylvania adopted the 1794 Act 
“to ameliorate the harshness of the law and limit capital punishment”); Wechsler & Michael, 
supra note 20, at 703 (noting that “the primary objective” of the new statute “was to limit the 
use of the death penalty”). 
 214. Keedy, supra note 2, at 771 (quoting 3 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PA. 14 (1793)). 
 215. See id. 
 216. 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PA., Jan. 29, 1794, at 80 
(1794) (emphasis omitted). 
 217. See 4 id., Apr. 22, 1794, at 250. As used in this Article, the “1794 Act” refers to the 
entire piece of legislation enacted into law in Pennsylvania on April 22, 1794, while the 
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This reform is traceable directly to Beccaria218 and Montesquieu.219 The 
preamble to section I of the 1794 Act, which abolished the death penalty for all 
crimes but first-degree murder, read as follows: 
WHEREAS the design of punishment is to prevent the commission of 
crimes, and to repair the injury that hath been done thereby to society or 
the individual, and it hath been found by experience, that these objects 
are better obtained by moderate but certain penalties, than by severe 
and excessive punishments: And whereas it is the duty of every 
government to endeavour to reform, rather than exterminate offenders, 
and the punishment of death ought never to be inflicted, where it is not 
absolutely necessary to the public safety . . . . 220 
This short preamble is a virtual synopsis of the views of Beccaria and Montesquieu. 
Its first clause, characterizing “the design of punishment” as the “prevent[ion] [of] 
the commission of crimes,” staked out the utilitarian position on penology. The 
preamble also set forth the principle of parsimony: “[T]he punishment of death 
ought never to be inflicted, where it is not absolutely necessary to the public 
safety . . . .”221 And the preamble then set out the critical point made by both 
Beccaria222 and Montesquieu223 that the prevention of crime is “better obtained by 
moderate but certain penalties, than by severe and excessive punishments.”  
2. Utilizing the Death Penalty Only Where Necessary to Achieve Deterrence 
Beccaria and Montesquieu, and their acolytes Bradford, Rush, and Wilson, 
posited what proponents of deterrence theory today purport to show empirically: 
that the deterrent effect of the penal sanction is not wholly contingent on the 
severity of the sanction, but, to the contrary, is largely contingent on its certainty 
and swiftness. In its simplest form, one can think of the components of general 
deterrence as represented by the equation 
 
D = S x C x W 
 
                                                                                                                 
“1794 Statute” refers only to that portion of the 1794 Act that defines first- and second-
degree murder. For the language of the relevant portion of the 1794 Statute in its final form, 
see supra text accompanying note 4. 
 218. See MAESTRO, supra note 2, at 138–39 (attributing the 1794 legislation to “[t]he 
great popularity of Beccaria in North America”). 
 219. See Bradley Chapin, Felony Law Reform in the Early Republic, 113 PA. MAG. OF 
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 163, 164 (1989) (“In those jurisdictions where the reformers succeeded, 
the influence of the Enlightenment rationalists, of Montesquieu and Beccaria, is written all 
over the record.”). 
 220. Keedy, supra note 2, at 772 (quoting 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., Apr. 22, 1794, at 242 (1794)). 
 221. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 276 (observing that the Act’s preamble states that 
“resort to capital punishment may be justified only as a measure of social defense, and then 
reluctantly”). 
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 169–70. 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
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where D represents the overall general deterrent effect of punishment, S represents 
the severity of punishment, C represents the certainty of punishment, and W 
represents the swiftness of punishment. 
It follows that, for the penal sanction to have a consistent deterrent effect, 
punishment severity must be increased when the certainty and swiftness of 
punishment are diminished. Theorists have made this claim for centuries. Johannes 
Andenaes reports: “Where the probability of detection of criminal behavior is low, 
legislatures are sometimes inclined to compensate by increasing the severity of 
penalties. In the history of criminal law this has been a recurrent theme.”224 The 
principle of parsimony, moreover, dictates a corollary to this rule: the severity of 
punishment must be increased only when necessary to achieve the desired deterrent 
effect. 
This exact view was propounded by William Paley, whose 1785 publication, 
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,225 was one of the many 
influences on James Wilson.226 Like Beccaria and Montesquieu before him, and 
Bradford, Rush, and Wilson afterward, Paley believed in the utilitarian principle 
that “[t]he proper end of human punishment is not the satisfaction of justice, but the 
prevention of crimes.”227 Like the others, he believed that this principle primarily 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 135 (1974); see also Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“[S]ince deterrent effect depends 
not only upon the amount of the penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but 
significantly more difficult to detect may warrant substantially higher penalties.”). One 
objection to this theory is that, if the risk of apprehension is low enough, an increase in 
punishment severity might well have no effect: 
[I]f potential offenders find in the uncertainty of apprehension a reason for 
believing that they will not be caught, they will be immune to the influence of 
severer penalties. . . . 
 If the threatened consequences are so high at the outset that only the 
foolhardy would find it worthwhile to run the risk of apprehension and 
punishment, the marginal deterrent effect of increased severity might well be 
minimal, for the foolhardy are a majority of the critical audience of a penalty 
change. 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 131, at 196–97; see also Andenaes, supra note 140, at 965 
(“[W]hen the risks of detection are considered small, it is possible that questions about the 
severity of the penalty tend to lose their significance.”). 
  There are two responses to this objection. First, Zimring and Hawkins are speaking 
to those who seek to increase the marginal deterrent effect through an increase in 
punishment severity. The situation facing Pennsylvania in 1794 was quite different. Their 
task was to maintain the expected deterrent effect of the penal law while using the capital 
sanction only when necessary. That is, the 1794 Statute did not increase sentencing severity 
for premeditated and deliberate murders; it reduced sentencing severity for other types of 
murders. Second, and more importantly, the fact that proponents of deterrence theory might 
be incorrect is beside the point. The claim here is merely that deterrence theory goes a long 
way in explaining, but not necessarily justifying, the premeditation-deliberation formula. 
 225. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Liberty 
Fund 2002) (1785). 
 226. See THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D., supra note 190, at 9, 
12 (citing Paley). 
 227. PALEY, supra note 225, at 373. 
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manifested itself in the ideas of general and specific deterrence.228 Also like the 
thinkers previously discussed, Paley believed that “[t]he certainty of punishment is 
of more consequence than the severity,”229 and adhered to the utilitarian principle 
of parsimony.230 
But Paley went further than other utilitarian penologists of his time by explicitly 
advocating that the severity of punishment be calibrated with the certainty of 
punishment. He wrote: “[T]he uncertainty of punishment must be compensated by 
the severity. The ease with which crimes are committed or concealed, must be 
counteracted by additional penalties and increased terrors.”231 He elaborated that 
the severity of punishment should be dictated, not only by the harm it causes, but 
also by the ease with which a crime is concealed: 
[T]he right of punishment results from the necessity of preventing the 
crime: for if this be the end proposed, the severity of the punishment 
must be increased in proportion to the expediency and the difficulty of 
attaining this end; that is, in a proportion compounded of the mischief 
of the crime, and of the ease with which it is executed. The difficulty of 
discovery is a circumstance to be included in the same consideration. It 
constitutes indeed, with respect to the crime, the facility of which we 
speak. By how much therefore the detection of an offender is more rare 
and uncertain, by so much the more severe must be the punishment 
when he is detected.232 
Thus, two equally pernicious crimes might be punished differently if one is easier 
to commit successfully—that is, easier to commit with impunity—than the other.233 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See id. (“The fear lest the escape of the criminal should encourage him, or others by 
his example, to repeat the same crime, or to commit different crimes, is the sole 
consideration which authorises the infliction of punishment by human laws.”). 
 229. Id. at 390 (emphasis in original). 
 230. Paley wrote: 
[P]unishment ought not to be employed, much less rendered severe, when the 
crime can be prevented by any other means. Punishment is an evil to which the 
magistrate resorts only from its being necessary to the prevention of a greater. 
This necessity does not exist, when the end may be attained, that is, when the 
public may be defended from the effects of the crime, by any other expedient. 
Id. at 374. 
 231. Id. at 377. 
 232. Id. at 375–76 (emphasis added). 
 233. See id. at 374 (“[T]he stealing of goods privately out of a shop may not, in its moral 
quality, be more criminal than the stealing of them out of a house; yet being equally 
necessary, and more difficult, to be prevented, the law, in certain circumstances, denounces 
against it a severer punishment.”); see also ANDENAES, supra note 224, at 135 
(“Compensating for weak enforcement with harsh penalties may . . . lead to severe treatment 
of one type of offense in relation to another offense which, although more reprehensible, is 
more easily detected.”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 197, at *16 (observing that at one time 
on the Island of Man, it was not a felony but a trespass to steal a horse or an ox “because of 
the difficulty in that little territory to conceal them or carry them off,” but “steal[ing] a pig or 
a fowl, which is easily done,” was a capital crime); cf. Frase, supra note 148, at 68 
(“[R]ealizing the goal of efficiently preventing future crime sometimes requires unequal or 
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3. The Structure of the 1794 Statute 
The central insight that punishment severity must be calibrated with the 
certainty and swiftness of punishment goes a long way toward explaining the 
premeditation-deliberation formula. The certainty and swiftness of punishment are 
diminished when a killing is planned out, because when a killing is planned, the 
perpetrator has likely thought out not just how to commit the crime but how to get 
away with it. Even where he is ultimately unsuccessful, his prior planning will 
likely, at the very least, delay his apprehension and punishment. Only in such cases 
is the death penalty necessary as a deterrent. This view of premeditation and 
deliberation as being less about the crime and more about the cover-up is consistent 
with important aspects of the medieval origins of modern homicide law and sheds 
important light on other parts of the 1794 Statute. 
a. Premeditation and Deliberation 
The notion that punishment severity should be enhanced when punishment 
certainty and swiftness are decreased provides the missing deterrence-based 
explanation for the premeditation-deliberation formula. When prospective criminal 
offenders believe that there is a relatively low likelihood that they will be 
apprehended and punished quickly for a particular crime, or a crime committed in a 
particular manner, more such potential offenders will be encouraged to commit the 
crime. In order to balance out this increased motivation to commit the offense, the 
severity of the punishment for the offense must be concomitantly increased. 
Seen in this way, the concept of premeditation and deliberation can be taken as a 
type of shorthand to refer to killings that are planned out in sufficient detail to 
allow the perpetrator to escape, or at least to significantly delay, detection, 
apprehension, and punishment. It is a common sense proposition that when a 
crime—be it homicide, robbery, or wire fraud—is contemplated, one of the primary 
considerations on the prospective offender’s mind is the successful completion of 
the crime. Successful completion of a crime necessarily includes the ability to 
enjoy the fruits of one’s criminal efforts without adverse consequences, and so true 
careful planning of a crime necessarily includes a concomitant plan to avoid such 
consequences.234 Accordingly, any rational prospective offender who truly plans 
out his crime will also plan out a way to avoid detection, apprehension, and 
punishment.235 Prior planning also affects the swiftness of punishment, albeit less 
directly. Even when a killer who has planned out his crime fails to completely 
escape detection, apprehension, and punishment, he has often planned sufficiently 
to at least delay the inevitable. 
                                                                                                                 
disproportional treatment.”). 
 234. See Kremnitzer, supra note 1, at 631 (observing that one perspective on deliberation 
“focuses on the plan and the scheming that is undertaken prior to the action,” such as “how 
to overcome the problems of time, place, instruments, expected obstacles in the path of 
success; and finally, how to evade justice” (emphasis added)). 
 235. See id. at 633 (“[A] person who acted on the basis of an advance plan is not 
surprised by the outcome, does not lose her cool, gets rid of traces of the act, acts to ensure 
evasion of justice . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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This view accords with the ancient understanding of murder, a concept that 
originated out of a special concern for secret killings. Even prior to the Norman 
Conquest of England in 1066, the Anglo-Saxons distinguished between secret and 
open killings: “The earliest English law on homicide concentrated exclusively upon 
the secrecy of the act.”236 Secret killings were considered “unemendable,” that is, 
ineligible to be remedied by compensation to the victim’s family, while open 
killings were “emendable.”237 The former type of killing was originally known as a 
“morth-slaying,” “morth” being a term used to connote all secret crimes.238 
The distinction took on special significance following the Conquest. The 
conquering Normans began to fall victim to secret homicides at the hands of the 
embittered population of subjugated Anglo-Saxons.239 “Morth” evolved into its 
Latinized form, “murdrum,”240 and William the Conqueror instituted a special fine, 
also called “murdrum,” to be paid by the local community (the “hundred”) 
whenever a Norman, though not an Anglo-Saxon, was killed and the killer 
remained at large.241 
                                                                                                                 
 
 236. Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 450; accord Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English 
Law of Homicide, 1200–1600, 74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 416 (1976) (“Th[e] distinction between 
slaying by stealth and slaying openly and of a sudden was embedded in Anglo-Saxon 
criminal law and survived after the Conquest at least until the middle of the twelfth 
century.”). 
 237. See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 486 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1984) (S.F.C. 
Milsom ed., 2d ed. 1898) (“[F]rom of old the Germanic peoples have commonly treated 
under the head of morth a few aggravated kinds of homicide which were unemendable 
crimes, while mere open and intentional slaying was emendable.”); Green, supra note 236, at 
416–17 (observing that stealthy slayings “were ‘botless,’ or unemendable crimes; that is, 
they could not be remedied through the payment of compensation (bot) by the slayer or his 
kin to the kin of the slain”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 270 (“Initially, homicides were 
distinguished based on the means used to carry out the killing—those committed by secrecy, 
under cover of night, or otherwise untraceable to the perpetrator were . . . not resolvable 
through emendment.”). According to Bracton, the distinction was introduced by Cnute, who 
ruled England from 1016 to 1035, in order to protect his Danish countrymen from the secret 
vengeance of the English. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 995 
n.75 (1932) (citing BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS 134b). 
 238. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 93, at 25, 28; see also PILLSBURY, supra note 2, at 100 (“In 
pre-Norman times ‘murth’ or ‘murther’ meant a secret killing.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 
270 (explaining that the term “‘morth’ . . . applied to secret crimes generally”). 
 239. See MORELAND, supra note 24, at 9 (“After the Norman conquest of England, the 
enmity of the subjected Anglo-Saxons sought satisfaction in secret slayings of Normans by 
waylaying.”); Mounts, supra note 2, at 271 (“Anglo-Saxon hatred of the conquering 
Normans often was expressed in secret killings accomplished by lying in wait.”). 
 240. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 93, at 25; Mounts, supra note 2, at 270. 
 241. See MORELAND, supra note 24, at 9 (“William the Conqueror imposed a heavy 
amercement fine called the murdrum upon any hundred where a Norman was found slain by 
an unknown hand.” (footnote omitted)); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 237, at 487 
(“[U]nder the Conqueror’s law the hundred paid a fine when a foreigner was slain and the 
slayer was not produced. This fine and its cause were alike known as a murdrum . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); Mounts, supra note 2, at 271 (“[T]he Norman monarchs . . . responded 
[to such killings] by imposing a heavy fine called the ‘murdrum,’ which was imposed on the 
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Gradually “murdrum” began to be used to connote all secret killings,242 that is, 
those in which the killer was not brought to justice243 or where the body of the 
victim was concealed.244 In the twelfth century, the distinction became less 
important, when “all homicide that was regarded as worthy of heavy punishment” 
became unemendable.245 However, according to Glanville, “murder” continued at 
that time to refer to “homicide which is committed in secret, no one seeing or 
knowing of it.”246 The distinction between secret and open killings also finds 
expression in the writings of Bracton, who distinguished between voluntary 
homicides in the presence and in the absence of witnesses.247 In 1340, the murdrum 
fine was abolished, there no longer being any foreign-born Normans among the 
English.248 But “murdrum,” of course, lived on, evolving into our own term 
“murder.”249 
Thus, the concept of murder, at its very origin, dealt specifically and explicitly 
with killings committed in secret so that either the perpetrator or the very act itself 
was concealed. The understanding that the premeditation-deliberation formula 
expresses a special concern for killings that take place after a period of planning 
sufficient to allow the killer to avoid or delay detection, apprehension, and 
punishment, therefore, accords well with the ancient roots of the law of murder.250 
                                                                                                                 
community if the killer was not produced.”). 
 242. See JOHN BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE 
AGES 53–54 (1973) (“Murder [in medieval England] meant not so much premeditated killing 
as homicide by stealth.”); cf. MORELAND, supra note 24, at 9 (“Anyone killed under such 
circumstances was presumed to be a Norman . . . .”). 
 243. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 237, at 487 (observing that the murdrum 
“was a fine occasioned by a secret homicide, a homicide secret in this sense that no one was 
brought to justice as its author”); 3 STEPHEN, supra note 93, at 28 (“‘[M]urdrum’ [was] 
distinguished from other forms of [homicide] not by any peculiarity in the offence itself, but 
by the fact that the criminal [wa]s unknown.”). 
 244. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 237, at 486 (“The word morth, which was 
known to Normans as well as to Englishmen, seems to imply concealment, in particular the 
hiding away of the dead body.” (footnote omitted)). 
 245. Id.; accord Green, supra note 236, at 417 (“The legal distinction between these two 
types of homicide was obliterated in the course of the reforms of Henry II (1154–1189).”). 
 246. Sayre, supra note 237, at 995 (quoting GLANVILLE (1187–89) lib. 14, c. 3); see also 
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 237, at 486 (“[I]n Glanvill[e]’s day one had still to 
distinguish that secret homicide which is murdrum from a mere homicidium.”).  
 247. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 93, at 29–30. 
 248. MORELAND, supra note 24, at 9 (“By 1340 there were practically no foreign born 
Normans left in England. Therefore, the fine was abolished in that year . . . .”); Sayre, supra 
note 237, at 995 (“By the fourteenth century . . . there were practically no foreign born 
Normans left . . . and the practice was definitely abolished in 1340.”). 
 249. See MORELAND, supra note 24, at 9 (“[T]he word ‘murder’ lived on as the worst 
kind of homicide . . . .”); Sayre, supra note 237, at 995 (“[T]he term ‘murder’ lived on in the 
popular imagination as the worst kind of homicide . . . .”). 
 250. Nor is it a wholly foreign concept that different types of murder should be treated 
differently based on considerations of deterrence. The English Homicide Act of 1957 did just 
that, designating as capital crimes five categories of murder for which the death penalty was 
thought “to be uniquely effective” as a deterrent. Sidney Prevezer, The English Homicide 
Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 624, 648–49 (1957) 
(quoting TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 1957, at 4 (statement of British Home Secretary)); see also 
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That this deterrence-based rationale constitutes one explanation for the 
premeditation-deliberation formula does not mean that other concerns are wholly 
absent. Quite the contrary, for when it came to distinguishing different types of 
murder, the 1794 Statute and its proponents fell back on retributivist reasoning and 
rhetoric. The division was made, according to the Act itself, because “the several 
offenses which are included under the general denomination of murder, differ so 
greatly from each other in the degree of their atrociousness, that it is unjust to 
involve them in the same punishment.”251 Similar language appears in both 
Bradford’s and Rush’s commentaries. Rush distinguished different types of murder 
based on their “atrocity.”252 And Bradford, in proposing that capital punishment be 
reserved for the “deliberate assassin,” wrote that “it were better that ten such 
atrocious criminals should suffer the penalty of [death], than that one worthy 
citizen should perish by its abolition.”253 The offense of deliberate assassination, he 
concluded, implicates “extreme depravity.”254 
Distinguishing crimes based on their “atrociousness” or “depravity” is obviously 
the language of the retributivist. Thus, that Bradford, Rush, and the 1794 Statute 
itself used such language in justifying the division of murder into degrees appears 
to validate the instincts of most commentators that the distinction is grounded in 
retributivist theory. This creates a paradox: why would Bradford and Rush, so 
heavily influenced by the deterrence-based thinking of Beccaria and Montesquieu, 
revert to retributivist language when it came to murder? Recent work by Paul 
Robinson and John Darley suggests two possible, related answers. 
Robinson and Darley persuasively argue, based on empirical research, that 
retributivist judgments are largely intuitive.255 That is to say, they are based on 
processes that are “‘fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit (not available to 
introspection), and often emotionally charged.’”256 On the other hand, utilitarian 
                                                                                                                 
Hart, supra note 141, at 437 (observing that the five classes of capital murder retained by the 
1957 Homicide Act “do not represent an attempt to distinguish between murders according 
to heinousness or moral gravity, but to select for capital punishment those types of murder in 
which its deterrent effect is likely to be most powerful”). It did so, not by focusing on the 
diminished certainty of punishment in some cases, but by focusing on homicides committed 
by “the professional criminal,” who was thought to be uniquely susceptible to the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(a), at 123 n.42 (1980); accord 
Prevezer, supra, at 649. 
 251. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1777, § 2, 15 Pa. Stat. at Large 174, 175 (emphasis added). 
 252. See RUSH, supra note 186, at 14 n.*. 
 253. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 147. Bradford’s views are particularly important, given 
that the word “deliberate” in the 1794 Statute is taken directly from his Enquiry. See Keedy, 
supra note 2, at 771 (“It seems clear that the words ‘wilful’ and ‘premeditated’ were taken 
from the Act of 1682 and the word ‘deliberate’ from the memoir of Justice Bradford.”). 
 254. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 147; see also id. at 149 (“[W]hen we consider how 
different, in their degree of guilt [many murders] are from the horrid crime of deliberate 
assassination, it is difficult to suppress a wish, that some distinctions were made in favor of 
homicides which do not announce extreme depravity.”). 
 255. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for 
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (“[T]he culturally shared 
judgments of the relative blameworthiness of different acts of wrongdoing are commonly 
intuitive rather than reasoned judgments.”). 
 256. Id. at 5 (quoting Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: 
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thinking is a product of a system of reasoning, which is “‘slower, serial, effortful, 
[and] more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled.’”257 That 
being so, it is possible that Bradford and Rush, and in turn the Pennsylvania 
legislators in 1794, while generally sympathetic to the deterrence theory espoused 
by Beccaria and Montesquieu, reverted to a more intuitive, retributivist assessment 
of murder, given the highly emotionally charged nature of the crime. 
It is also possible that Bradford and Rush—with or without the complicity of the 
Pennsylvania lawmakers—used this retributivist language strategically. As 
Robinson and Darley go on to argue, “there is great utility in a criminal justice 
system that provides for a distribution of liability and punishment in concordance 
with the citizens’ shared intuitions of justice.”258 If utilitarian considerations 
deviate somewhat from those intuitions, it seems far easier to convince a citizenry 
that its intuitions are just a bit different from what it thinks they are than to give up 
those intuitions altogether.259 A strategic utilitarian thus would be well served to 
clothe his policy choices regarding gradations of punishment in retributivist 
language, even if those policy choices are primarily driven by utilitarian 
concerns.260 
Whatever the specific motivations of those responsible for drafting the 1794 
Statute, our task is to formulate a justification for the premeditation-deliberation 
formula that not only is consistent with the prevailing penological zeitgeist of 1794 
but also makes some sense today. And as most commentators have taken pains to 
assert, retributivism, even when alloyed with incapacitation, provides a meager 
justification for the premeditation-deliberation formula. In order to provide a fuller 
account, one must go past the language of the 1794 Statute to its fundamental 
penological underpinnings. The claim is not that the deterrence-based rationale 
advanced here provides the sole explanation for the formula. The claim is rather 
that such a rationale is indispensable, in conjunction with more conventional 
retributivist and incapacitationist rationales, to a complete understanding of the 
premeditation-deliberation formula. 
b. Specific Means 
The two specific means of murder that the 1794 Statute designated as first-
degree—poison and lying in wait—can also be explained at least in part by looking 
to the concern for detecting and punishing murderers. While this portion of the 
Statute, like the premeditation-deliberation formula, is conventionally understood 
                                                                                                                 
Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 698 (2003)). 
 257. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kahneman, supra note 256, at 698); cf. id. at 38 
(“[I]t is desert, not deterrence or incapacitation, that drive people’s intuitive assignments of 
punishment.”). 
 258. Id. at 18. 
 259. See id. at 52 (“[R]ather than trying to ‘talk people out of’ their existing intuitions, a 
more effective approach may be to fight fire with fire . . . .”). 
 260. E.g., Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model Penal Code, 
and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (asserting that Herbert Wechsler, 
chief architect of the Model Penal Code, took the view that when liberal reform faced 
popular opposition, reform measures “should be incorporated, even camouflaged, within 
larger initiatives that accommodated retribution”). 
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on retributivist grounds, the deterrence rationale provides a complementary 
explanation that presents a fuller picture as to why these specific means of killing 
were singled out. 
i. Poison 
Once one recognizes the significance of the certainty and swiftness of 
punishment in the deterrence equation, the special status of murder by poison in the 
1794 Statute is easier to understand. First, in an age before the advent of modern 
explosive technology,261 murder by poison was the only way to kill remotely. One 
could poison another and be miles away by the time the poison had been taken and 
anyone realized a crime had occurred. Thus, capturing and punishing the killer who 
chose to murder by poison was particularly problematic, at least when compared to 
the killer who chose the pistol, club, or stiletto as his weapon. 
Even more importantly, however, at a time when forensic toxicology was in a 
primitive state, even detecting that a murder by poison had occurred was 
problematic. Poisoning is one of the most secretive of crimes, because it involves 
two layers of secrecy.262 Like many other homicides, it typically occurs in the 
privacy of the home.263 Yet “there [i]s another aspect to the secretness of poison: 
unlike other weapons, poison d[oes] its work on the interior of the body, leaving no 
visible signs of violence.”264 Consequently, death by poison often simulates death 
by natural causes, so it is often difficult to tell the difference between the two.265 
This is true even today, when forensic toxicology has become a well-developed 
field.266 But that field began to take shape only in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.267 The founding of modern toxicology is generally dated to the 1814–15 
                                                                                                                 
 
 261. The safety fuse, for example, was not invented until 1831. See STEPHEN R. BOWN, A 
MOST DAMNABLE INVENTION: DYNAMITE, NITRATES, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
WORLD 77 (2005). 
 262. See Mark Essig, Poison Murder and Expert Testimony: Doubting the Physician in 
Late Nineteenth-Century America, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 177, 181 (2002) (“Poisoning 
involved a double secrecy.”). 
 263. See id. (“[Poisoning] was carried out secretly, within the home, behind closed 
doors . . . .”). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. (“Because the symptoms of some poisons resembled those of disease, it was 
often difficult to tell whether a person had died from poison or from natural causes.”); see 
also id. at 194 (“The symptoms of morphine poisoning—in particular, deep coma and very 
slow respiration—were thought to be very similar to a number of diseases, including uremic 
poisoning . . . and cerebral hemorrhage.”). 
 266. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Arsenic and Old Chemistry: Images of Mad Alchemists, 
Experts Attacking Experts, and the Crisis in Forensic Science, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 
27–29 (2009) (discussing 2007 case of Cynthia Sommer, who was convicted of poisoning 
her husband, but had charges against her dropped after the expert testimony at her trial was 
severely attacked following the verdict). 
 267. See DEBORAH BLUM, THE POISONER’S HANDBOOK: MURDER AND THE BIRTH OF 
FORENSIC MEDICINE IN JAZZ AGE NEW YORK 1 (2010) (“The chemical revolution of the 
1800s changed the relative ease of . . . killing[] [by poison].”); Caudill, supra note 266, at 3 
(pointing out “[t]he advancements in toxicology during the first half of the nineteenth-
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publication of Mateu Orfila’s Traité des Poisons,268 which was available in this 
country in 1817.269 And the Marsh test, which became the generally accepted 
method for testing for arsenic in Britain,270 was not developed until 1836.271 It was 
not until “the 1840s [that] toxicology had emerged as the first modern forensic 
science.”272 In a number of notorious cases in the early to mid-nineteenth century, 
when forensic toxicology was in its infancy, alleged killers were convicted and 
sentenced to life imprisonment or death for murder by poison before the deaths 
were discovered to have been the result of natural causes.273 Others were convicted, 
and some executed, in cases where the evidence of poisoning was very 
problematic.274 
But if nineteenth-century Americans were concerned that natural deaths were 
being mistaken for cases of poisonings, they were absolutely terrified of the 
reverse. After all, if a death from natural causes could be mistaken for a poisoning, 
the opposite is equally true. Mark Essig paints a portrait of a society gripped by 
fear of a crime that, according to official statistics, was exceedingly rare:275 
Nineteenth-century Americans suspected that many cases of poisoning 
escaped detection altogether. “We do not know how many persons who 
were buried as having died of disease, may have died of poison,” one 
physician explained. Every poison murder case that made it to trial 
raised the fear that scores more had gone undetected. This fear of 
undiscovered crime lay at the heart of the nineteenth-century obsession 
with poison murder. . . . It was this uncertainty that made poisoning 
such a dreaded crime.276 
                                                                                                                 
century, particularly with respect to detection of arsenic”). 
 268. Caudill, supra note 266, at 18 & n.103; see also BLUM, supra note 267, at 1–2. 
 269. Caudill, supra note 266, at 23 n.137 (“American editions of Orfila’s works were 
available by 1817 . . . .” (citing S. K. Niyogi, Historic Development of Forensic Toxicology 
in America up to 1978, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 249, 251–52 (1980))). 
 270. See id. at 26 (“The Marsh test was publicized in the 1840 Lafarge trial by Orfila, and 
was soon the prominent method of arsenic detection in English trials.”). 
 271. Caudill, supra note 266, at 19 n.105; see also BLUM, supra note 267, at 2. 
 272. Essig, supra note 262, at 181. 
 273. See Caudill, supra note 266, at 1–2, 11–15 (discussing 1828 Pennsylvania case of 
Mrs. William Logan, accused of poisoning her husband but later cleared); id. at 22 
(discussing 1859 British case of Thomas Smethurst, convicted of murder by poisoning but 
later pardoned); id. at 23 (discussing 1826 British case of Hannah Russel, convicted of 
murder for poisoning her husband, but later pardoned based on new evidence). 
 274. See also id. at 15–16 (discussing 1817 New York case of Abraham Kessler, 
executed for poisoning his wife); id. at 16–17 (discussing 1853 New York case of John 
Hendrickson, wrongfully executed for poisoning his wife); id. at 18–19 (discussing 1840 
French case of Madame Lafarge, sentenced to life imprisonment for poisoning her husband); 
id. at 21 & n.121 (discussing 1856 British case of William Palmer, accused of poisoning 
three people). 
 275. Essig, supra note 262, at 180 (“Available statistics suggest that poison murder . . . 
accounted for a tiny fraction of the total number of murder cases.”). 
 276. Id. at 181 (footnote omitted) (quoting Charles T. Jackson, Statistics of Poisoning in 
New England, 63 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 389, 389 (1860)). 
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And what was true of nineteenth-century Americans during the infancy of 
forensic toxicology was also true of late eighteenth-century Americans, when the 
science was in what can only be termed its embryonic stage. Prior to the 
publication of Orfila’s treatise, testing for arsenic focused on its physical, as 
opposed to chemical, properties.277 Such tests were performed as early as 1752,278 
but were not widely publicized until about a half-century later.279 Thus, in the 
United States, “before ‘1800 virtually no local practitioners could test a corpse for 
signs of poisoning.’”280 Accordingly, “more often than not poisoners walked 
free . . . [and] [a]s a result murder by poison flourished.”281 
This background sheds much light on why Pennsylvania in 1794 would punish 
murder by poison as first-degree murder. It was exceedingly difficult to detect at 
that time, using the most primitive of tools, that such an event was even a 
homicide. And even if the fact of murder could be established with some 
confidence, the perpetrator of the murder might still be in doubt, given the ability 
of the perpetrator to escape the scene before the deed was done.282 According to 
classic deterrence theory, since the perceived probability of punishment was 
significantly lower for murder by poison than for the typical intentional killing, the 
severity of the threatened punishment would have to be enhanced to maintain the 
hoped-for deterrent effect of the law.283 Support for this view comes from Gabriel 
                                                                                                                 
 
 277. See Caudill, supra note 266, at 23–24 (discussing 1752 examination based on 
physical, rather than chemical, properties of arsenic and performed by Anthony Addington 
for the English trial of Mary Blandy). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. at 24 & n.140 (discussing publication of descriptions of various tests in 1803, 
1805, and 1806). Interestingly enough, one of these tests was performed by none other than 
Benjamin Rush. Id. at 24. 
 280. Id. at 23 n.137 (quoting JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 51 (1993)); see also BLUM, supra note 
267, at 1 (“Until the early nineteenth century few tools existed to detect a toxic substance in 
a corpse.”). 
 281. BLUM, supra note 267, at 1. Blum reports that, prior to 1800, murder by poison 
“became so common in eliminating perceived difficulties, such as a wealthy parent who 
stayed alive too long, that the French nicknamed the metallic element arsenic poudre de 
succession, the inheritance powder.” Id. 
 282. Even today, murder by poison is particularly problematic in that respect. When one 
thinks of the most notorious unsolved crimes of the last generation, surely one of the first 
that springs to mind is the series of poisonings that occurred in the Chicago area in 1982, 
when a still-unknown assailant placed cyanide in Tylenol capsules that were then placed 
back on store shelves and sold to unsuspecting consumers. See Jonathan Saltzman, Fatal 
Tampering Case Is Renewed: FBI Searches a Condo in Cambridge, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 
2009, at B1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/ 
2009/02/fbi_searches_ho.html (describing the FBI’s search of the home of a leading suspect 
in the still-unsolved Tylenol killings). 
 283. Like secret homicides in general, murder by poison also holds a particular 
significance in the development in modern homicide law. In 1530, murder by poison was 
made high treason, punishable by boiling the offender to death. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 93, at 
44; Mounts, supra note 2, at 270 n.39. At least one commentator has claimed, albeit without 
support, that “murder by poison merited execution by boiling because poisoners were 
especially difficult to apprehend.” Rudolph J. Gerber, Economic and Historical Implications 
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Tarde, who in 1912 wrote, though unfortunately without supporting data, “that the 
number of cases of poisoning decreased very rapidly towards the middle of th[e] 
[nineteenth] century, from the time when discoveries in chemistry and toxicology 
made it possible more surely to discover the causes and the perpetrator of this type 
of crime.”284 
Admittedly, there are also retributivist and incapacitationist rationales for 
elevating murder by poison to first-degree murder. First, the murderer who kills 
remotely is arguably more culpable because he is cowardly—one might say 
“unmanly,” in the vernacular of 1794—compared to the killer who has to confront 
his victim face-to-face.285 Second, poisoning was a uniquely effective way in 1794 
not only of killing remotely but of killing multiple persons simultaneously, making 
the poisoner at once more culpable and more dangerous. A disgruntled servant 
might poison her employer’s entire dinner party; a sociopath might kill many of the 
inhabitants of an entire village by poisoning its water source. 
Yet, like the premeditation-deliberation formula itself, the murder-by-poison 
provision is starkly overinclusive if its rationale is solely retributivist or 
incapacitationist in nature.286 First, it clearly covers single-victim poisonings, such 
as when a jealous husband poisons his unfaithful wife, a situation far more likely to 
occur than a mass killing of strangers.287 In addition, poison might well be used in a 
mercy killing, infanticide, or suicide pact killing, homicides that critics of the 
premeditation-deliberation formula have noted are among the most sympathetic of 
intentional murders.288 Thus, the retributivist and incapacitationist bases for 
heightened punishment for poisoners provide an incomplete account at best. A 
deterrence-based rationale, focused on the difficulty of detecting, apprehending, 
and punishing poisoners, helps to fill in the gaps. 
ii. Lying in Wait 
Quite obviously, a special concern for stealthy killings also animates the 
heightened punishment for “murder . . . perpetrated by means of . . . lying in 
wait.”289 Lying-in-wait murder has been defined as “‘concealment for the purpose 
of taking the victim unaware.’”290 That is to say, “[t]he defendant must be hidden 
                                                                                                                 
for Capital Punishment Deterrence, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 437, 446 
(2004). 
 284. GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY 476 (Rapelje Howell trans., 1912). 
 285. See Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 458 (characterizing the act of the poisoner as 
“cowardly subterfuge”). 
 286. See Crump, supra note 7, at 293 (“These specific-means definitions of first-degree 
murder exhibit the flaw of disparity just as the premeditation-deliberation formula does: a 
disconnect from blameworthiness.”). 
 287. See Jack D. Marietta & G.S. Rowe, Violent Crime, Victims, and Society in 
Pennsylvania, 1682–1800, 66 PA. HIST. 24, 31 (1999) (“Most murder victims knew their 
assailants—like most of their modern counterparts. 23.8 percent of murder cases which led 
to the death sentence involved persons related to the victims.”). 
 288. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b), at 127 (1980) (including as among the 
most sympathetic intentional killings “most mercy killings . . . [,] suicide pacts, [and] many 
infanticides”). 
 289. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1777, § 2, 15 Pa. Stat. at Large 174, 175. 
 290. Comment, Lying in Wait Murder, 6 STAN. L. REV. 345, 345 (1954) (quoting People 
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from his victim” so as to facilitate “a successful attack.”291 Murder by lying in wait 
involves “‘waiting, watching, and secrecy’” on the part of the perpetrator.292 
Indeed, what we would call lying-in-wait murder animated the special concern 
for secret killings in medieval times. The secret killings of Normans by Anglo-
Saxons that gave rise to the term “murder”293 generally involved “waylaying, i.e., 
killing by stealth from ambush.”294 Thus, what we now call waylaying, ambush, or 
lying in wait, those in the twelfth century knew simply as murder.295 Such a crime 
was deemed either unemendable or emendable only with a heavier financial 
sanction, or wite, than was typical.296 This special concern for lying-in-wait murder 
led, in 1389, to a statute that treated such killings more seriously than the typical 
murder by denying to the Crown the authority to pardon anyone who killed in such 
a manner.297 
Again, the special treatment of lying-in-wait murder has generally been 
explained on retributivist grounds.298 First, like murder by poison, murder by 
ambush can be seen as particularly cowardly because it deprives the victim of the 
chance to defend himself.299 Second, it can be regarded as particularly cruel, 
                                                                                                                 
v. Tuthill, 187 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947)); see also Perkins, supra note 19, at 447–48 (“‘Lying 
in wait’ . . . means ‘hiding in ambush or concealment . . . [with the] purpose of taking the 
person attacked unawares . . . .’” (quoting State v. Tyler, 97 N.W. 983, 985 (Iowa 1904))). 
 291. Comment, supra note 290, at 346. 
 292. Id. at 345–46 (quoting Tuthill, 187 P.2d at 21); see also FLETCHER, supra note 2, 
§ 4.4.6, at 305 (noting that lying in wait is defined in California as “waiting and watching for 
an opportune time to act, together with a concealment by ambush or some other secret design 
to take the other person by surprise” (citing Caljic § 8.25)); H. Mitchell Caldwell, The 
Prostitution of Lying in Wait, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 311, 326 (2003) (“[W]aiting, watching, 
and secrecy, or concealment . . . are the essentials of lying-in-wait murder.”); Merrill K. 
Albert, Note, Criminal Law: Homicide: Murder Committed by Lying in Wait, 42 CAL. L. 
REV. 337, 338 (1954) (“[I]t is generally stated that lying in wait requires three elements: 
watching, waiting, and concealment, for the purpose of taking the victim unawares.”). 
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 243–53. 
 294. Albert, supra note 292, at 337–38 (emphasis in original). 
 295. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 237, at 468 (“[A] premeditated, or as we 
should say intentional, assault takes the place of lying in wait, lying in ambush.”); Caldwell, 
supra note 292, at 322 (“[A] more accurate synonym for twelfth century ‘simple’ murder 
was killing while lying in wait or by ambush.”); see also Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 450 
(tracing especial seriousness of lying-in-wait murder under English law to pre-Norman focus 
on secret killings). 
 296. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 237, at 469 (observing that killing by 
ambush was “a specially reserved plea of the crown to be emended, if indeed it was 
emendable, by a heavy wite”). 
 297. See Caldwell, supra note 292, at 323. 
 298. See id. at 322–23; Albert, supra note 292, at 337 (“English law . . . regarded a 
murder committed by lying in wait as a particularly heinous and repugnant crime.”); 
Comment, supra note 290, at 350 (asserting that poisoning and lying in wait “were 
considered the most infamous type of murder”). 
 299. See BELLAMY, supra note 242, at 54 (asserting that homicide by stealth “was 
heinous, not because of any evil preparations, but because it caught a man off his guard”); 
MORELAND, supra note 24, at 199 (observing that “the crime of killing by lying in wait [was] 
a homicide of extreme heinousness,” in part “because of its cowardly nature”); Caldwell, 
supra note 292, at 353 n.281 (“Being murdered without a chance to defend yourself is a 
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especially in an earlier and more religious age, to end someone’s life without 
providing the victim the opportunity to prepare for the next world.300 
At least one commentator has explained the special treatment of lying-in-wait 
murder on incapacitationist grounds as well. Samuel Pillsbury casts the secret killer 
as among the most dangerous, a hidden traitor in the midst of the community: “The 
secret killer . . . represents the most dangerous enemy of peaceful human society 
because his crime smacks of treachery; he is the mole in the moral community. By 
contrast, the provoked killer openly confronts his victim.”301 Thus, by failing to 
afford the victim the right of self-defense, the lying-in-wait killer is not only more 
culpable for his cowardice, but he is also more dangerous because he is more likely 
to succeed in the act of killing. 
But as with premeditation and deliberation, if the rationale for treating lying-in-
wait murder more seriously than intentional murder generally is retributivist and 
incapacitationist in nature, then the lying-in-wait category is both underinclusive 
and overinclusive. It is underinclusive because any murder in which the victim is 
taken by surprise can be seen as particularly repugnant and dangerous.302 Take, for 
instance, the killer who travels to the victim’s house at night, silently enters through 
the front door, and cuts the victim’s throat. Or imagine the killer who walks up 
behind the victim on a public street and fires a gun at her head at close range. In 
neither instance has the killer afforded the victim a chance for self-defense or self-
reflection before death. Yet, in neither case can we properly say that the killer has 
lain in wait.303 
At the same time, at least from a retributivist perspective, the lying-in-wait 
category is arguably overinclusive as well. For one thing, the quality of the killer’s 
                                                                                                                 
particular [sic] vulgar and undesirable way to die.”); Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 450 n.40 
(noting that concept of lying in wait “suggests lack of opportunity for self-defense which 
may be offensive in a culture that honors the use of violence in mutual combat”); Albert, 
supra note 292, at 340 (observing that concealment evinces “cowardice”). 
 300. See Caldwell, supra note 292, at 322 (“Throughout western civilization, special 
scorn has been reserved for those who murdered by surprise or otherwise in a fashion that 
deprived the victim of the opportunity for reflection and contrition.”). 
 301. Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 458. 
 302. See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 93, at 94 (observing that treating murder by waylaying as 
especially serious “has the strange peculiarity that it includes waiting for a man and excludes 
pursuing him”); Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 450 (“The worst killings may involve ‛open’ 
slaughter . . . .”); see also Pauley, supra note 2, at 167 (suggesting that “a cold-blooded killer 
who follows an elderly woman home from the supermarket, and then stabs her to death forty 
times with a steak knife in front of her grandchildren on the steps of her home” is 
“particularly heinous” despite the fact that the killer “did not conceal himself before the 
killing”). 
 303. See Richards v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 120, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(rejecting the contention that merely killing a victim unawares from behind constitutes a 
lying-in-wait murder); Caldwell, supra note 292, at 356 n.316 (asserting that characterizing a 
front-door entry as “lying in wait” would stretch the concept “to the point of 
meaninglessness”); see also Pauley, supra note 2, at 167 (observing that lying in wait has 
been held to be absent “where the defendant waited for the victim in his own living room, or 
followed the victim on the street, or stood outside with a shotgun in anticipation of the 
victim, or sat in a parked car with a gun outside the defendant’s store before the shooting” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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reasoning abilities may be so poor as to cry out for mitigation.304 For another, with 
regard to some secret killings, the killer’s actions might be understandable, though 
not forgivable.305 
What has been largely overlooked is the deterrence-based concern for lying-in-
wait murder, centered around the difficulty of detecting, apprehending, and 
punishing the killer. It appears that no one has made this connection since Roy 
Moreland observed, more than a half century ago, that both retributivist and 
deterrence-based concerns animate the strictures against lying-in-wait murder. He 
wrote that, in medieval England, “the crime of killing by lying in wait continued to 
remain a homicide of extreme heinousness, because of its cowardly nature and the 
difficulty of discovering the assassin in such cases.”306 
What really distinguishes the two hypothetical murders discussed above from a 
true lying-in-wait murder is that, with respect to the latter, the killer has taken 
special measures to avoid detection. The killer who merely enters the front door of 
a home or pursues his victim on the street has done nothing to reduce the possibility 
that witnesses will see and be able to identify him. By taking their victims 
unawares, they act in a cowardly and repugnant fashion, and are therefore highly 
culpable. By depriving the victims of the opportunity for self-defense, they also 
increase the likelihood that the killings themselves will succeed, and they are 
therefore very dangerous. But only by watching and waiting in secrecy—that is, by 
lying in wait—to be confident that there are no witnesses can each of these killers 
also maximize the likelihood that the crime will be a complete success, that is to 
say, committed with impunity.307 
The conventional retributivist and incapacitationist view of lying-in-wait murder 
has focused on concealment from the victim. A deterrence-based view, centered on 
the certainty and swiftness of punishment, looks to concealment from potential 
witnesses. A true lying-in-wait murder involves both levels of secrecy: concealment 
not only from the victim but from potential witnesses as well. What makes a true 
lying-in-wait murder distinctive, then, is that its special treatment in the law can be 
explained on all of these grounds—retributivist, incapacitationist, and deterrence-
based—at once. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 304. See Pillsbury, supra note 5, at 450–51 (“Secret killings may not involve the highest 
level of rationality; even with an opportunity to consider consequences, emotional stress or 
mental disturbance may influence the quality of the actor’s practical reasoning and present 
grounds for mitigation.”). 
 305. See id. at 451 (“[O]ne who kills in secret may have good cause for grievance against 
the victim.”). 
 306. MORELAND, supra note 24, at 199 (emphasis added); see also Caldwell, supra note 
292, at 368 (“If there is no physical concealment, is there really a difficulty . . . in finding out 
who the murderer is?”). 
 307. See 3 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 452 (1956) (“The criminal’s chances of success [a]re his 
chances of impunity . . . .”). 
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c. Felony Murder 
Finally, there is the felony murder provision of the 1794 Statute: “[A]ll 
murder . . . which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first 
degree . . . .”308 This provision, too, is best explained on grounds of deterrence. 
Recall that the 1794 Act not only separated murder into two degrees, reserving 
capital punishment for first-degree murder. It also eliminated capital punishment 
for arson and rape,309 establishing the potential prison term for arson at five to 
twelve years,310 and for rape at ten to twenty-one years.311 Eight years earlier, 
Pennsylvania had eliminated capital punishment for robbery and burglary,312 setting 
the maximum prison term for those crimes at ten years.313 Finally, the 1794 Act 
also established the potential prison term for second-degree murder at five to 
eighteen years.314 
Given all this, the deterrence rationale for retaining the death penalty for felony 
murder predicated on “arson, rape, robbery or burglary” is obvious. A murder 
committed during one of these crimes, absent evidence of premeditation and 
deliberation, poisoning, or lying in wait, would otherwise constitute second-degree 
murder. But if the punishment for second-degree murder were five to eighteen 
years in prison, the rational arsonist, rapist, robber, or burglar would be induced to 
kill his victim, thereby eliminating perhaps the only witness to the crime, in order 
to greatly reduce the probability of apprehension. After all, the robber or burglar 
who kills his victim would face a scant eight additional years in prison over and 
above what he might face for the robbery or burglary; the arsonist, only six 
additional years than he might face for the arson; and the rapist, perversely, three 
fewer years than he might face for the rape. 
Beccaria and Montesquieu, and their Pennsylvania disciples, recognized these 
perverse incentives created by a system that punished most felonies equally. 
Montesquieu claimed: “In Russia where the punishment of robbery and murder is 
the same, they always murder. The dead, say they, tell no tales.”315 By contrast, 
wrote Montesquieu: “In China those that add murder to robbery, are cut into pieces; 
but not so the others . . . .”316 The result, according to Montesquieu, was that 
robbers in that country “never murder.”317 Beccaria wrote: “If an equal punishment 
is laid down for two crimes which damage society unequally, men will not have a 
stronger deterrent against committing the greater crime if they find it more 
advantageous to do so.”318 Bradford echoed these words when he wrote: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 308. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1777, § 2, 15 Pa. Stat. 174, 175. 
 309. See supra text accompanying note 217. 
 310. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1777, § 2, 15 Pa. Stat. 174, 175. 
 311. Id. at 175–76. 
 312. See supra text accompanying note 208. 
 313. Act of Sept. 15, 1786, ch. 1241, § 1, 12 Pa. Stat. at Large 280, 281. 
 314. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1777, § 2, 15 Pa. Stat. 174, 176. 
 315. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 171, at 131 (footnote omitted). 
 316. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 317. Id. 
 318. BECCARIA, supra note 165, at 21. 
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Whatever be the punishment inflicted on the higher degrees of murder 
it ought to be widely different from that of every other crime. If not 
different in its nature at least let there be some circumstance in it 
calculated to . . . remove the temptation which the villain otherwise has 
to prevent the discovery of a less crime by the commission of a 
greater.319 
While the prison term for second-degree murder was potentially longer than 
those for arson, robbery, and burglary, the drafters of the 1794 Act likely 
understood that one should “expect a decline in the marginal disutility of 
imprisonment as sentences lengthen.”320 For one thing, “[t]he early part of a 
criminal sentence is when much of its damage is done.”321 The “damage” done 
early on in a criminal sentence includes its stigmatic effect, adverse impacts on 
employment opportunities, effects on familial relations, and the shock of 
adjustment to severe “restraints on liberty and threats on well-being.”322 For 
another thing, because future events are heavily discounted, especially among 
potential offenders,323 “offenders should be less deterred by the last years of a 
sentence than by the first years.”324 When one factors in the expected steep drop in 
the certainty and swiftness of apprehension, prosecution, and conviction when one 
kills the only witness to his crime, the rational felon could be expected to take the 
gamble of a few extra years in prison in hope of impunity.325 Only an increase in 
the severity of the sentence—from prison to death—could offset the inducement to 
kill.326 
                                                                                                                 
 
 319. BRADFORD, supra note 2, at 148 (emphasis in original); see also RUSH, supra note 
185, at 9 (observing that the robber or burglar can naturally be expected to “add murder to 
theft, in order to screen himself, if he should be detected”). 
 320. Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 
982 (2008). 
 321. Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict 
Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 95 (1991). 
 322. Id.; see also Binder, supra note 320, at 982 (observing that conviction of a crime 
and “incarceration may have a permanently stigmatic effect irrespective of the length of 
imprisonment”). 
 323. See supra text accompanying notes 155–58. 
 324. Binder, supra note 320, at 983; see also Cole, supra note 321, at 95 (“Discounting 
exaggerates the effects of the disproportionate occurrence of pain during a prison 
sentence.”). It might be true that felons who killed their victims faced a term of 
imprisonment for murder in addition to the prison term for the predicate felony. Without 
knowing sentencing practices at the time, it is impossible to say whether consecutive 
sentences were typically imposed under such circumstances. See The Supreme Court, 2008 
Term: Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 199–201 (2009) (observing that founding-era 
practice on consecutive and concurrent sentencing was unclear and unsettled). In any event, 
for the reasons stated in the text, an additional prison term on top of that threatened for 
commission of the underlying felony was probably thought to be deeply discounted in the 
mind of the felon. 
 325. See Cole, supra note 321, at 95 (“From a deterrence perspective, treating murder 
monolithically effectively affords potential felony murderers with fewer—not more—
incentives to abstain from killing.”). 
 326. See id. at 91 (“Felons will generally view resulting death simply as a means of 
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Of course, that the imposition of the death penalty could be thought to be the 
only effective way to prevent violent felons from intentionally killing their victims 
does not fully explain the felony murder provision of the 1794 Statute. After all, as 
conventionally understood, the felony murder doctrine also covers unintended 
killings, even those that are accidental, that occur during felonies.327 Commentators 
have noted “[t]he illogic of the felony-murder rule as a means of deterring 
killing . . . when applied to accidental killings occurring during the commission of a 
felony,” for accidents cannot be deterred.328 However, as Guyora Binder has 
persuasively argued, felony murder liability in 1794, while it covered more than 
intentional killings, did not cover all deaths occurring during a felony. Rather 
liability “was limited . . . to deaths resulting from acts of violence committed in the 
furtherance of particularly dangerous felonies.”329 Thus the felony-murder rule in 
1794 covered only conduct that was both committed during felonies and that was 
independently culpable—that is, reckless or grossly negligent—with regard to the 
death of the victim.330 The distinctive aspect of the felony-murder rule was that it 
elevated what would ordinarily be manslaughter to murder because the death 
occurred during the commission of a dangerous felony.331 
Given this, the felony murder provision of the 1794 Statute makes sense on 
deterrence grounds. Retaining capital punishment for felony murder predicated on 
arson, rape, robbery, or burglary could be thought not only to discourage those 
committing such felonies from intentionally killing their victims, but also to 
encourage such felons to affirmatively exercise due care with regard to those 
victims. Absent the threat of capital punishment, even those violent felons who 
might not be induced to kill their victims might yet be induced to accomplish their 
                                                                                                                 
ensuring escape or silencing witnesses, both of which are simply means to financial reward. 
If the cost of causing death is increased, we might expect these felons to regard causing 
death as inconsistent with their own motivation—committing a financially beneficial 
crime.”). 
 327. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 30 (1980) (“The classic formulation of 
the felony-murder doctrine declares that one is guilty of murder if a death results from 
conduct during the commission or attempted commission of any felony.”). 
 328. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 451 (1985); cf. David Crump & Susan 
Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 
371 (1985) (“The argument against deterrence often proceeds on the . . . assumption that 
felony murder is addressed only to accidental killings and cannot result in their deterrence.”). 
 329. Binder, supra note 320, at 978; see also Guyora Binder, The Origins of American 
Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 187–97 (2004); Leonard Birdsong, Felony 
Murder: A Historical Perspective by Which to Understand Today’s Modern Felony Murder 
Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 18 (2006) (asserting that felony-murder liability 
existed in 1794 “only if the felonious act was known to be dangerous to life and likely to 
cause death”). 
 330. See Binder, supra note 320, at 978 (“American reformers did not, by and large, see 
felony murder liability as strict liability, but instead saw felonious motive as one of a number 
of forms of culpability aggravating already culpable homicides to murder, or to murder of a 
higher degree.” (emphasis in original)). 
 331. See id. at 983 (characterizing as “the distinctive feature of felony murder liability” 
the fact that it “aggravates liability for unintended homicide based on certain felonious 
motives”). 
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felonies with reckless disregard to whether their victims died.332 This is so because 
the consequence of such recklessness—elimination of witnesses to the crime—
inures to their benefit, thus presenting a strong inducement not to exercise due care. 
This answers Binder’s objection that a deterrence rationale for the felony-murder 
rule “does not explain why manslaughter liability suffices as a deterrent for reckless 
nonfelons, but not for reckless felons”333: reckless nonfelons gain no benefit when 
their conduct kills, while reckless felons benefit through elimination of one or more 
witnesses to their crimes. One could reasonably conclude that only the threat of the 
death penalty can act as a motivation to exercise due care, given the strong 
inducements to the contrary. 
B. A Look at a Modern Statute: The California “Drive-By Shooting” Provision 
To see a modern example of how retributivist, incapacitationist, and deterrence-
based concerns may work together to distinguish first- from second-degree murder, 
one need look no further than the “drive-by shooting”334 provision of section 189 of 
the California Penal Code. That section is an expanded version of the 1794 Statute 
and includes within the definition of first-degree murder any “murder which is 
perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally 
at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death.”335 
The retributivist and incapacitationist concerns underlying this provision are 
fairly obvious. From a retributivist standpoint, one who discharges a firearm from a 
vehicle, at least where the vehicle is moving at the time, is arguably more culpable 
than someone shooting on foot. This is because the shooter knowingly risks the 
death or serious injury of large groups of innocent people in addition to the 
intended target.336 These typically include children and adolescents. Indeed, one 
study found that children and adolescents comprised 30% of those shot at in drive-
                                                                                                                 
 
 332. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the 
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1449 (1994) 
(characterizing as “the more prevalent of the two main deterrent explanations of felony-
murder” the fact that “[t]he goal is to encourage greater care in the performance of felonious 
acts”). 
 333. Binder, supra note 320, at 983. 
 334. See KELLY DEDEL, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE: PROBLEM-SPECIFIC 
GUIDE NO. 47: DRIVE-BY SHOOTINGS 2 (2007) (“A drive-by shooting refers to an incident 
when someone fires a gun from a vehicle at another vehicle, a person, a structure, or another 
stationary object.”). 
 335. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2010). 
 336. See H. Range Hutson, Deirdre Anglin & Marc Eckstein, Drive-By Shootings by 
Violent Street Gangs in Los Angeles: A Five-Year Review from 1989 to 1993, 3 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 300, 301–02 (1996) (finding that nearly half of those shot at in drive-by 
shootings in Los Angeles during a five-year period were “innocent bystanders,” “defined as 
[those] with no known gang affiliation, who w[ere] shot at, injured, or killed in a drive-by 
shooting”); see also DEDEL, supra note 334, at 3 (“The specifics of a drive-by shooting—in 
which the shooter is aiming a gun out the window of a moving vehicle at a moving target, 
and is often inexperienced in handling a gun—mean that shots often go wild and injure 
people or damage property that was not the intended target.”). 
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by shootings in the City of Los Angeles in 1991,337 and that close to one-quarter of 
all child and adolescent homicide victims in Los Angeles in 1991 were victims of 
drive-by shootings.338 A similar study found that over half of the homicide victims 
of drive-by shootings in Los Angeles County from 1979 to 1994 were children and 
adolescents.339 Thus, the drive-by killer is arguably more culpable than the average 
killer because of the grave risk of death he creates for large numbers of people. 
For similar reasons, we might reasonably conclude that the drive-by killer is 
more dangerous than the average killer. By undertaking a drive-by shooting, he 
manifests his willingness to put more than just his intended target in harm’s way.340 
Because he risks the lives of many people at once, the drive-by killer is arguably 
more dangerous, and therefore in greater need of incapacitation, than his pedestrian 
counterpart. 
But what if these considerations are not present in a particular case? It seems 
that the drive-by killer who targets a lone victim with no risk to innocent 
bystanders is neither more culpable nor more dangerous than the pedestrian killer. 
Perhaps he is less dangerous, in fact, because of the difficulty in shooting someone 
from a moving vehicle. Indeed, David Crump utilizes California’s drive-by 
shooting provision as a prime example of the defects of statutes based on the 1794 
Statute. 341 Crump posits two scenarios. In the first, two armed men are sitting on 
the curb when a bicyclist appears; one man dares the second to kill the bicyclist; 
and, without hesitation or thought, the second man raises his gun and fires a shot at 
the bicyclist, killing him.342 The second scenario is identical except that the two 
men are sitting in a car at the time.343 In California, the killing in the first scenario 
would likely be second-degree murder, while that in the second would, because of 
the drive-by shooting provision, be murder in the first degree.344 Crump notes the 
absurdity of treating the two murders differently based on the fortuity of whether 
the killer and his cohort happen to be inside or outside of a vehicle, observing that 
the “distinction does not correlate with blameworthiness at all.”345 
But the distinction is absurd only if one looks at the law of homicide solely 
through the eyes of a retributivist. Once one takes deterrence into account, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 337. H. Range Hutson, Deirdre Anglin & Michael J. Pratts, Jr., Adolescents and Children 
Injured or Killed in Drive-By Shootings in Los Angeles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 324, 324 
(1994) (finding that of 2222 people shot at, 677 were under the age of 18). 
 338. Id. at 326–27 (“The 36 homicides resulting from [drive-by] shootings 
represented . . . 23 percent of all homicides among children and adolescents in Los Angeles 
in 1991 . . . .”). 
 339. H. Range Hutson, Deirdre Anglin, Demetrios N. Kyriacou, Joel Hart & Kelvin 
Spears, The Epidemic of Gang-Related Homicides in Los Angeles County from 1979 
Through 1994, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1031, 1033 (1995) (“Child and adolescent victims 
accounted for 681 homicides (50.2%) by drive-by shootings.”). 
 340. See Hutson et al., supra note 337, at 327 (“Since a large number of people can be 
injured or killed in one incident, the morbidity and mortality, the total medical cost, and the 
cost to society are enormous.”). 
 341. Crump, supra note 7, at 295–99. 
 342. Id. at 295–96. 
 343. Id. at 299. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
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distinction starts to look more sensible. When one shoots another as a pedestrian, 
escape is difficult. While bystanders may be too fearful to take action themselves, it 
is likely that they would be able not only to summon the authorities quickly but to 
identify the gunman.346 Not so for one who chooses to kill by shooting out of a 
vehicle. First, such a culprit may be very difficult to identify, especially if the 
vehicle is moving at the time, and especially if the shooting takes place under cover 
of darkness, as such shootings typically do.347 More importantly, where the 
perpetrator is already in a vehicle when the shooting occurs, escape from the scene 
is much more likely.348 Indeed, not only is the distinction sensible,349 but it is the 
foundation for the Fourth Amendment rule that, while a warrant based on probable 
cause is necessary to search a package that might contain evidence of a crime, the 
need for a warrant evaporates once the package enters a readily mobile vehicle.350 
Thus, like the premeditation-deliberation formula itself, retributivist and 
incapacitationist concerns can only partially explain California’s decision to make 
drive-by shootings that result in an intentionally inflicted death first-degree murder. 
Only a deterrence-based theory, centered around the difficulties of detecting, 
apprehending, and punishing the perpetrators of such crimes, can fill in the gaps 
and better explain why this particular form of murder has been singled out for 
harsher treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
The premeditation-deliberation formula is like a two-legged stool, uneasily 
supported by retributivist and incapacitationist rationales. When understood solely 
with regard to the culpability and dangerousness of the premeditated and deliberate 
killer, the stool is shaky. A third rationale, deterrence, is necessary for a complete 
understanding of the doctrine. A deterrence-based rationale, focused on the 
diminished certainty and swiftness of punishment when killers plan out their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 346. This is not to say that bystanders would be willing to do so, but only that they would 
be able to do so. See, e.g., Jamie Masten, Note, “Ain’t No Snitches Ridin’ wit’ Us”: How 
Deception in the Fourth Amendment Triggered the Stop Snitching Movement, 70 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 705, 705–06 (2009) (describing the “Stop Snitching” movement as having “gathered a 
whole generation of teens and young adults who are refusing to talk to the police—even 
when they are innocent witnesses to violent crime”). 
 347. See Hutson et al., supra note 337, at 326 (“Drive-by shootings usually occurred at 
night, when it was difficult to identify automobiles, license plates, and faces, thus lessening 
the possibility of apprehension.”); see also DEDEL, supra note 334, at 7 (“Many drive-by 
shootings occur under the cover of darkness, either to help the shooters avoid detection or 
because the precipitating events occur at night.”); THE VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, DRIVE-BY 
AMERICA 2, 7 (2007) (estimating that close to three-quarters of drive-by shootings over a six-
month period took place between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.). 
 348. See DEDEL, supra note 334, at 2 (“Using a vehicle allows the shooter to approach 
the intended target without being noticed and then to speed away before anyone reacts.”). 
 349. See Cohen, supra note 87, at 359 n.4 (“[I]t seems to me appropriate . . . to say that 
shooting from a car merits special harsh treatment, perhaps because of . . . the difficulty of 
apprehending drive-by killers . . . .”). 
 350. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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crimes, proves a good fit for the premeditation-deliberation formula. When a killer 
plans out his crime, as when he decides to kill by poison or by lying in wait, he 
significantly increases the probability that he will evade, or at least delay, detection, 
apprehension, and punishment. Thus, classic deterrence theory tells us, punishment 
severity must be enhanced to counterbalance this effect. 
Whether this explanation for the premeditation-deliberation formula provides a 
justification for its continued use is a separate question. But there is little doubt that 
those directly and indirectly responsible for the 1794 Statute that first articulated 
the formula had deterrence foremost in their minds. In attempting to understand the 
formula, we ignore classic deterrence theory at our peril. 
  

